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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The election is not a place for ‘criminals’, wipe out the military culture” 
”Pemilu bukan ajang premanisme, hapuskan budaya militer”  
  
Thus read the banners held by protesters outside the Gaja Mada University a few 
weeks prior to the 2004 presidential elections. The protesters lamented that the 
continued use of militaristic symbols and violence by party affiliates and supporters 
of politicians, since the fall of Suharto’s New Order ran contrary to the spirit of 
reformasi – democratic reform. The political realities in Indonesia bear witness to a 
dual situation of institutionalization of democratic practices on the one hand, 
accompanied by the flourishing of militia-like organizations and criminal gangs on 
the other hand. It is this unnerving puzzle of the function and realities of this dualism 
that this thesis sets out to discuss. This study thus sets out to discuss the structures 
and dynamics that make violence such a persistent phenomenon in ‘democratic 
Indonesia’.   
The implementation of democratic reform is conceived to defer the use of 
violence by the state as a means to dominate and manipulate subordinates. After all, 
violence had been the main tool for the state to control and govern the New Order 
state from 1965 until May 1998 when the streets filled with protestors and pro-
democracy activists to oust Suharto from his presidential palace. Since the inception 
of grass root activism and opposition during those Maydays, the problems of 
democratization and transition have weighed down the hopes for a successful 
‘transition’ to demokrasi. Beyond the promotion of democratic reform accompanied 
by decentralization reforms implemented at high speed since 1999, the promotions of 
demokrasi and reformasi seem to have been accompanied by the incorporation of 
criminals and corrupt elites at all levels of the state.  
 
1.1 Empirical Justifications  
The persistence of violence takes place against the backdrop of democratization 
reforms and decentralization reforms implemented at high speed since 1999. 
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Elections have been carried out at the central level and at the local level, judged to be 
a success by international observers (EUEOM 2004). It is significant that however 
noble expressions in support of democratic principles and ideals, most organizational 
vehicles for political and social expression in Indonesia carry with them at an arms 
length paramilitary units and militias ready to flex their muscles whenever needed. 
Ironically, these militia wings of the political parties bloomed amidst a political 
climate driven by the desire for the demilitarization of the state. “Cabut dwifungsi 
ABRI” – “kick the army out of politics” was the resounding demand of 
demonstrators, graffiti artists, and reform-minded politicians in 1998. Internally 
however, each of the large parties claiming reformist agendas built what were 
essentially private armies on the pretence of party security (King 1999: 10). The 
immediate creation of civilian militias might be understandable considering the 
special circumstances in which political parties and politicians found themselves in 
the immediate aftermath of Suharto’s step down from power. However, the security 
mandate of satgas expanded as quickly as their numbers and it became evident that 
the 1999 election was to be contested via the same violent methods which had 
secured Golkar victory over the past since 1966. For half a decade now, these 
organizations have reorganized themselves, manifested their positions in society, and 
become a ‘normal’ and even ‘accepted’ parts of the scramble for power despite 
processes of ‘democratization’ and ‘decentralization’. The concept of militias and 
paramilitaries is not new to Indonesia as such. party security groups, satgas parpol , 
have existed since the early 1980s. The New Order dynamics incorporated criminal 
structures and mafia networks at the local level.  The question of relevance here is 
how dominant actors on the Indonesian playing field relate to and make use of 
democratic instruments of power, also those that use violence.   
Often one meets the impressionistic picture drawn between the apparent chaos 
and violence of recent years and the stability of the New Order regime. Despite the 
bloody circumstances in which Suharto came to power in 1966, Suharto’s Indonesia 
has come to acquire the image of a calm, well-ordered society in the 1980s and 
1990s. In reality the New Order regime under Suharto had institutionalized violence 
as part of the state (Anderson 1999). Along these lines, a trend within scholarly 
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literature as well the Indonesian free press has been to argue that the existence of 
paramilitary groups and the persistence of a so-called culture of violence -
kebudayaan kekerasan- is merely a carry-on from the New Order regime (Collins 
2001). According to this line of argument, violence is explained in terms of 
authoritarian elements that have survived Suharto’s fall and is now struggling to gain 
their share of the cake. From this angle, anti-democratic predatory elites who 
command their own private armies operate side by side with democratic and non-
violent pro-democrats in both political and civil society, and thus they merely 
represent a counter-force that is expected to wither away as democracy takes a 
stronger foothold in the country. This study seeks to take issue with such positions, 
arguing that violence must be interpreted and viewed in relation to the real political 
changes since the demise of the New Order authoritarian rule.  
There is in fact very little knowledge of the new emerging patterns of political 
practices and the continuation of violence. A recurring puzzle about democracy is 
how, in a post-conflict or in a post-dictatorship situation, different political actors 
have used the democratization process and discourse in order to maneuver in the 
political arena. This is a common phenomenon all over the world where gangsters, 
politicians, businessmen, and various forms of intelligence agents interact and 
compete for state power and resources while at the same time relating to the 
democratic realities, running for elections and operating within the existing structures 
of the political realities.  
 
1.2 Research Focus 
The theoretical puzzle relevant for the above-stated problem attack the dominant 
theories on democracy and democratization. The thesis aims at critical discussion on 
the formative processes of reworking the structures and dynamics within which 
violence-groups exist and the structures to which they relate.  These changing 
realities are characterized by implementation of democratic instruments and freedoms 
such as freedom of organization and freedom of speech. Recent years have seen a 
number of transitions to liberal democracy and a burgeoning academic literature on 
this ‘third wave’ of democratization. Many of these transitions and associated 
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academic discourse have had a narrow focus on the minimalist institutional 
requirements of liberal democracy. In Indonesia, elections have been hailed as sign of 
a successful transition towards democracy and so Indonesia scores high on most 
indicators of democratization. The democratization paradigm, as it will be discussed 
in chapter two of this thesis, does not offer a satisfactory framework or variables that 
can explain why violence persists. The structures of power and contextual realities of 
actors do not fit into the framework of conventional transition studies. This means 
that one needs to find more fitting tools for grasping the realties of political life in 
Indonesia.  
The emphasis of this thesis in on the structures and dynamics that makes 
violence persistent, seeking primarily to highlight significant changes with regards to 
the way politics is played out in Indonesia, and secondly to strengthen the supposition 
that local contextual analysis is precarious for understanding the real dynamics of 
local politics in developing countries. In order to make available working tools for 
analyzing and structuring the empirical material, variables form the “crafting of 
democracy paradigm” as exemplified by conventional transition theory, and the 
additional dominating trend rooted in “the neo-liberal agenda” of the World Bank and 
the IMF will be juxtaposed with relevant arguments/analytical tools form the 
discussion on violence. The institutional reforms necessitates the questions of (1) 
whether decentralization and decentralization in fact promote less violence, or a 
whether one is in fact seeing decentralization of violence, (2) whether 
decentralization and local elections lead to enhanced accountability, or in stead 
strengthens various forms of local despotic rule (3) whether the emphasis on civil 
society not just ignores the real potential for violence mobilization of social forces in 
what might be termed ‘uncivil society’.   
The theoretical foundation for analyzing violence in Indonesia will be rooted in 
historical and structural arguments that deal with two central themes relevant for 
analyzing violence, namely the role and implications of local elites in relation to the 
state, and the role and implications of those social forces mobilized into violence 
groups. The selection of these focus points lean on dominant theoreticians in the field 
of local Indonesian politics as exemplified by Nordholt, van Klinken, Sidel, and 
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Törnquist as well as a more historically rooted discussion on the symbiosis between 
crime and politics in Indonesia. 
 In order to be able to interpret violence in Indonesia a selective reading of 
historical narratives will be essential in order to trace the particular lines in history 
that serve to explain specific current dynamics. Secondly the thesis will analyze the 
way dominant actors relate to democratic institutions and the implications of 
decentralization reforms on how violence is mobilized and used, and thirdly the thesis 
will look at how violence groups are organized and mobilized in order to say 
something about the contexts within which thy flourish. The next chapter will further 
discuss the theoretical foundation and systematization of this thesis.  
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2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Politics is about organized power, democratic politics about participation and power 
sharing. The thesis aims at critical research on the formative process of reworking 
state/society- relations around the incorporation of principles of alteration of power 
centers via democratic principles of governance. This requires a conceptual 
framework that can address the complex dynamics of power and especially the role of 
actors and strategies that politicize, realize and transform the sphere and nature of 
social organization and dominance within the political space of a democratic state. 
There is no one comprehensive theory on collective political violence in new 
democracies. Conceptually democracy and violence belong to two separated spheres. 
The existence of violence represents the ultimate negation of meaningful democratic 
politics. Theoretically, it is fruitful to attempt a bridging of the dominant variables 
and trends in the idealist discussion on democracy with the much grimmer variables 
and empirical observations on violence in Indonesia. This chapter will define and 
limit the theoretical terrain within which text material and empirical material will be 
analyzed and interpreted.  Methodologically the chapter will systematize the 
arguments found in a broader debate on violence that counter the determinant 
assumptions (independent variables) found in the general debate on elite crafting of 
democracy and the liberalist and neo-institutionalist recipe for democratization as it 
has been implemented in Indonesia1. The following few paragraphs will highlight the 
core arguments and guidelines that have shaped the democratization process in 
Indonesia in order to juxtapose these specific theoretical arguments to the debate on 
violence in Indonesia. This is not a project on democratization in Indonesia, but one 
                                              
1 The theoretical discussion bases itself on a pro-contra analysis, although not in its strictest form. In philosophical 
traditions (see Næss 1971, Bergström and Boreus 2000 ) the pro-contra analysis aims at systematizing the arguments in a 
specific text or group of texts in order to make qualified verifications regarding the specific arguments of the text(s). One 
main argument or position consists of one or several arguments. Small arguments support the main argument, or hypothesis 
– taking a pro-position in support of the main hypothesis of the text(s). The same text or other texts, treating the same or a 
different theme/position may present specific counterarguments to the hypothesis, or arguments that in essence qualify as a 
“counter” argument in Næss’ terms. In a less strict sense, this thesis qualify from a broader debate the specific variables 
within one debate on democracy, in order to juxtapose (contra) these to the variables in the debate in democracy. This is 
done in order to systematize and qualify a set of variables or dimensions that shapes the empirical debate violence within a 
framework of institutional democratization.  
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that looks at the interconnection between certain specific explanatory variables for 
violence in relation to the crafting of democracy in Indonesia.  
  
2.1 The Democratization Paradigm  
The theoretical focus on democratization has gone through various shifts regarding its 
focus and agenda. The overall expectations have been that democracy is a natural 
expectation and demand for oppressed peoples. Such were the demands of those who 
flocked the streets of every Indonesian urban center in 1998: the overthrow of the 
patriarch held within it an automatic demand for demokrasi. Historically Indonesian 
politics has gone along the global trends of decolonization, implementation of some 
sort of parliamentarian democracy in the 1950s, followed by a longer period of 
military-cum-civilian dictatorship overthrown in the makeshift period of the late 
1990s. There is a great variety between the various theories on transitions from 
authoritarian to democratic rule in their emphasis on general or specific and 
contextual variables. In most cases, the transition studies lay out a set of general 
conditions and variables for how the process should and ought to be carried out. In 
this sense democratization may be defined in terms of the promotion and further 
development of democracy as an idea and as a method (Törnquist 1999: 219). The 
various theoretical positions on democratization vary between a focus on what goes 
on inside and what goes on outside the established political system. One of the most 
important questions concerning democratization is the preconditions. In addition to 
the minimalist institutional requirements of free and fair elections, freedom of speech 
and association, there is disagreements regarding the importance of capitalist market 
economy or socio-economic inequality (see Törnquist 1999, ch 12).  
 
2.1.1 The Transition-Paradigm 
The role of the middle classes in political transformation such as democratization has 
repeatedly been emphasized since the 1950s. The modernization school, as 
exemplified by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) focused on socio-economic 
development arguing that economic development and widespread higher education 
are conducive to democratization, partly because they strengthen the moderate middle 
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class. In the 1960s, when a number of African countries received their independence 
scholars such as Huntington (1967), among others, stressed the importance of stable 
political institutions, organization, leadership in economic development and 
democratization to structure the uncontrollable masses. Also in Huntington’s third 
wave discussion the importance of the expanding, moderate middle class growing out 
of economic development has continued to be emphasized.  
But, the theoretical puzzle surfaced as development and an expanding middle 
class has not automatically lead to democratization in all developing countries. One 
example is Indonesia where, while economic development accelerated and the middle 
class grew in significance, the members of this middle class mostly supported the 
authoritarian regime (Törnquist 2000). It is clear that the mere existence of a large 
middle class does not automatically trigger democratization.  
There exists a plethora of transition studies and theories that focus on 
conscious and committed actors in the construction and consolidation of democracy. 
Since the end of the Cold War the fall of authoritarian states around the world has 
resulted in a bourgeoning literature on transition theories explaining the fall of 
dictatorships and how democracy should be crafted (Scmitter and O’Donnell 1986, 
Huntington 1991, Linz and Stepan 1992 and 1996, Diamond 1994). These scholars 
rid themselves of more outdated modernization theories, and substituted them with 
the newer and more en vogue concepts of soft-and hard liners, institutional 
mechanisms of liberal democracy, and the conditions and possibilities of elites in 
crafting such institutions with varying emphasis on the importance of each variable. 
The dynamics changes from various actors, but generally, there has been a special 
emphasis on negotiations and pact-making within and between existing political and 
economic elites. In this approach, which Potter has named the ‘transition approach’ to 
the study of democratization; democracy is conceptualized as a set of government 
institutions and procedures, rather than rule by the people (Harriss et.al 2005: 20). 
Special emphasis is placed on negotiations and pacts within the political elite of party 
officials, politicians, office-holders and bureaucrats. Shmitter and O’Donnell aregues 
that the impulse for liberalization in authoritarian regimes comes from within the 
regime itself: from a conflict between hard liners who seek to maintain the 
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authoritarian regime and soft liners who seek to initiate a process of liberalization in 
an effort to legitimize the regime (1986: 15-21). The elites start to regard 
authoritarian regime as “dispensable”, and thus see themselves more at ease with a 
breakdown of the authoritarian structures. Soft -and hard-liners interact with each 
other to try a change the rules of the game. This pact-making on democracy can be 
successful because the elite see their position as secure also within the new system.  
In a situation where the authoritarian regime has demonstrated its incapacity to 
uphold capitalist development, the regime actors will be squeezed out to the side, 
while central elements of a moderate elite will retain power. In most cases 
liberalization of the authoritarian regime is accompanied by the resurrection of civil 
society (ibid: 26-27, 48-56) in which increased social mobilization creates pressure 
for democracy (see also Foweraker and Landman 1997). Despite this bottom up 
impulse for democratization, the authors tend to emphasize the important role played 
by the elites in the democratic transition as they from negotiated pacts which set out 
“the rules governing the exercise of power” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 37). In 
addition much of the compromise was in keeping out any kind of radical forces from 
the negotiations, and also denying them a space in politics. The main criticism is thus, 
from scholars like Carothers (1999) that it intrinsically make inaccurate assumptions 
about the role and power of the elite and civil society. 
In addition, the crafting of democracy perspective is leaning too much on the 
mere description of what has happened elsewhere, an element that leads one to ignore 
the role of ordinary people who also have prepared the way for democratization. As 
Törnquist contends, that in countries where authoritarian rule contributed to rapid 
social and economic development, the elite does not necessarily behave the way it is 
expected to according to the transition theorists. In this situation horse-trading 
between the various power-holders combined with top-down mobilization through 
patron-client bonds (and ethnic and religious loyalties) behind politicians battling to 
gain access to state resources is likely. Indonesia and Nigeria are perfect examples of 
this sort.  “Democracy is visualized as a set of procedures negotiated by and between 
political leaders. Thus transition approach separates democracy from its essential 
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meaning as rule by the people and conceptualizes it principally as the establishment 
of a set of governing institutions” (Grugel 2002:61).  
This poses a challenge for studies on democratization to consider the 
democratic or non-democratic role of both the elite and actors in civil society. The 
theory leans on the assumption that democracy can be crafted, and is closely related 
to the assumptions that political elites and alliances can be encouraged and led by 
international actors “in support of good governance, including privatization and 
decentralization, and the strengthening of civil society” (Harriss et.al. 2005: 20).  
The successful carrying out of local and national elections has in many 
countries triggered the international community to assume a successful transition to 
democratic politics (see Linz and Stepan 1992, Huntington 199, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986). The elections serve to motivate both political parties from before the 
authoritarian period and newly formed political parties to assume a prominent role in 
the democratic transition while the election itself is seen as a founding event. In the 
face of the political realities in the developing world the transition paradigm has 
received a lot of criticism. Grugel (2002) points out that many of these transitions and 
the associated academic discourse has had a too narrow focus on the minimalist 
institutional requirements of liberal democracy, most notably the conduct of free and 
fair elections. Beetham (2000) describes this as a tendency to elevate a means to an 
end, to mistake institutional instruments with their democratic purpose. In stead he 
proposes that democracy should be defined in terms of underlying principles, while 
the institutions that uphold democracy should be defined secondarily. 
 In the same way as democracy is being crafted through the implementation of 
various institutions, the transition paradigm also deals with violence institutionally. 
Linz and Stepan (1996: 108) have acknowledged the difficulty in assessing the 
importance of political violence in the struggle for democracy. For the Basque 
separatists it was assumed that institutional arrangements such as negotiations and 
approval of autonomy status, election of the Basque parliament, formation of a 
Basque government, and the transfer functions to the government (ibid: 105-108) 
decrease the levels of violence. It is clear however that institutional measures alone 
have not put an end to the conflict. The devolution of authority in the case of 
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Northern Ireland is a similar detraction in which the institutional measures are meant 
to serve to curb violence. This leads one to ask search for another paradigm that can 
eventually pave the way for different and new variables that may explain why 
political violence can continue in a democratic setting such as that of Spain and the 
UK.   
  
2.1.2 The neo-Liberal Agenda  
The policies implemented in transitional countries are very much defined by the 
stance and direction of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at 
any particular point in time. The issue of democracy has been closely related to that 
of the state, as is illustrated in the shift from ‘less government’ to ‘good governance’ 
in which civil society and the local state have emerged as delineated domains for 
democratization to occur. In authoritarian countries it was the state that was the root 
of the problem. The collapse of the most extreme forms of statism with the fall of the 
communist states, gave an impetus to the development agenda to reduce the size of 
the state. Reducing the size of the state was the dominant policy during the 1980s and 
the early 1990s when countries in Africa, Asia, and the former USSR emerged from 
authoritarian rule. During these years the World Bank, The IMF, and the US 
government stressed measures to reduce the degree of state intervention in economic 
affairs (Fukuyama 2004: 20). The liberalist/neoliberalist agenda of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ shaped very much of the democratization agenda by focusing on building 
down the state rather than strengthening the state. They key actors saw the state 
sector as the core obstacle to growth, and assumed that economic liberalization would 
put the political systems back on track. A vast number of institutional reforms have 
been introduced under the auspices of the international community in order to shape 
formal local institutions in accordance with normative principles of rule of law and 
free and fair elections, and other basic freedoms as crucial variables ensure further 
‘development’. The main problem was that reducing state capacity was 
misconstructed as an effort to cut back state capacity (ibid.), and so the efforts of 
economic liberalization were assumed to be failing because of failing governments.  
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 In centre periphery relations the case has also been to bridge the democratic 
deficit between the center and the periphery by implementing decentralization 
reforms.  
The World Bank and the IMF were forced to move beyond their strict 
economic focus, to take on a political role. The term ‘good governance’ involved 
establishing a strong legal framework for development, and mechanisms for 
producing ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (Harriss et. al 2005: 23). The Bank 
does not talk explicitly about democracy and democratization, but does in most 
instances assume the existence of an electoral democracy. The liberalist agenda 
emphasizes such concepts as participation and civil society which are most 
frequently associated with NGOs and local voluntary organizations rather than 
concepts related to conventional democratic practice such as political parties or 
actors that form part of a ‘political society’. Accordingly, participation and 
accountability is best ensured through decentralization reforms. These concepts are in 
turn forwarded in relation to privatization of state enterprise and government, as well 
as decentralization of the state. In other words, although the World Bank has 
reformed critically around its previous efforts to minimize the state, it now focuses on 
reducing the scope of the state, weakening the central state and strengthening local 
government.   
The main implementers and driving forces behind such changes is a non-
political, non-stately founded ‘civil society’. In academic research on Indonesia this 
expectation and potential of a civil society has triggered a trend in which much of the 
literature treating civil society organizations and structures in Indonesia has mainly 
focused on mapping out the work and organizational structure of NGO’s and other 
political organizations in Indonesia.2 These studies assume that civil society is 
autonomous from the state (both central and local) and that they incorporate some 
element of social and political reform in their agenda and activism (Rodan 1996: 20-
24).  
                                              
2 Apart from a few new studies that seek to analyze the potential of a civil society up against the new democratic 
institutions. such as  
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The critique against the liberalists and proponents of World Bank initiatives 
are manifold, but the most relevant for this thesis is the emphasis on the relative 
strength and potential in society, it views democratization and development 
independent of political competition and conflict between different social groups and 
classes (Harriss et.al. Mohan and Stokke 2000). The new conditions for economic 
development and ‘good governance’ are found in the peculiar construction of “an 
increasingly unconstitutional, de-institutionalized, and de-politicized democracy” 
(Harriss et al 2005).  
 
2.2 Theorizing Violence  
The above discussion has highlighted the role and implications of various variables 
and concepts dominant in the democratization paradigm; elites, decentralization of 
the state, good governance, and civil society. In this respect the following question is: 
what are the pros and cons of the democratization paradigm as discussed above with 
regard to violence? The concepts elaborated on above are highly relevant for 
theoretical discussion on aspects of democratization in developing countries, but 
leave a number of questions unanswered: Why, in face of various degrees of 
democracy, is there still violence? The following discussion will make available tools 
for contextual analysis with regards to violence by categorizing the theoretical 
positions into three broad themes: arguments based on political economy, on a 
historical/structural dimension, and one treating the function of the ‘actually existing 
civil society’ when it comes to violence groups. The themes presented here are 
constructed for analytical purpose and while they tend to overlap, perhaps more often 
than not, they will serve to frame the analysis. There is no necessary causal 
relationship between the variables for democracy and those explaining violence, but 
the juxtaposition illustrates the problematic nature of democratization theories and 
arguments that have been used for Indonesia and within which framework the 
empirical material will be discussed.  
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2.3  Arguments rooted in Political Economy Approach  
The surprise and bewilderment among observers with the fall of the New Order, came 
as a result of the dominating trend analyzing the Indonesian state more in terms of an 
autonomous, highly centralized machine, than a bi-polar arena within which many 
interests were competing for power. From a conflict perspective elites are broadly 
divided between functionalists who view elites as a natural part of the social system 
and thus also integral to its functioning, and those leaning towards a more Marxist 
position seeing elites as largely parasitic. In the literature treating the events in post-
Suharto Indonesia the image of a parasitic elite that deflates democratization by 
simulating both communal and non-communal conflict is common both in popular 
perceptions and academic literature. Snyder (2000) argues for example that the 
democratic space that opens up in multicultural societies easily is occupied by an 
anti-democratic elite that aims at manipulating ethnic sentiment in order to deflect 
popular demands for democracy. Furthermore, democratization is likely to deflate 
when these elites are unwilling or unable to adapt to democracy. Those explaining the 
democratic deficit in Indonesia in terms of political economy tend to focus on the 
predatory, anti-democratic traits and behavior of the elite. Robison’s and Hadiz’ 
(2004) focus is on the way entrenched interests and political alliances have proved 
able to reorganize their ascendancy in face of economic crisis and regime change. 
Conflict and violence erupt, either as a byproduct of a broader conflict in the process 
of building new alliances between old oligarchic elites or that it becomes an integral 
part of the way in which oligarchs are forced to operate in order to maintain their 
power (Robison and Hadiz 2004). These oligarchs are rooted in the New Order 
political economy initially deriving their wealth from speculative growth in 
investment and dept which also rendered the regime extremely vulnerable to global 
capital markets.  In this perspective the oligarchs, whose interests during the 1990s 
were increasingly being limited by those very state structures that has enabled them 
to operate, no longer needed the authoritarian state as their key mediator. 
Accordingly, the upper echelons of the New Order elite who were integral to the 
crafting of democratic institutions (compromising to give up their political positions, 
but maintaining their economic and social assets), rather than promoting democracy 
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are merely reinventing themselves as political entrepreneurs, corporate moguls, and 
criminal bosses of new market economics and democratic politics (see Robison and 
Hadiz 2004: 185-223). With the implementation of democratic instruments, 
engagement in politics is only necessitated by the requirement to control, capture and 
dominate the political arena, rather than ‘participate’ in it. The oligarchic power base 
derives from their strength to control the political economy of the state. Real 
‘politicking’ takes place outside the official democratic instruments. It is a façade 
democracy. In this regard, state-sponsored violence is no longer needed to protect the 
economic interests of the oligarchs: they are financially strong enough on their own. 
Violence is subcontracted to their private moguls as a means to maintain their 
oligarchic position.  
Violence, whether by civilian organization or military auxiliaries is a natural 
by-product of power struggles between elites who pretend to be democratic, but in 
reality are using their powers to make decisions on political and financial matters 
outside the democratic institutions. Violence is a result of the complex politico-
business oligarchy and the ongoing reorganization of its powers through successive 
crises, colonizing and expropriating new political and market institutions (ibid.). On a 
critical note, arguments rooted in political economy leave out a number of important 
explanatory factors. The discussions inspired by political economy tend to frame the 
discussion in terms of economic predatory interests of the elite, and tend to portray 
the actually existing democracy as a mere sham to which no social forces or historical 
implications matter. The following paragraphs offer attention to structuring 
arguments around broader themes that focus on what has shaped the Indonesian 
trajectory, what are the elite dynamics, and how should one interpret the social forces 
that mobilize and instrumentalize the means of violence within the democratic 
setting? 
 
2.4 Historical/Structural Arguments  
The next part will discuss various theories that look at the shaping of political 
structures, laying the foundation for the empirical study. In this respect a pattern of 
social control under local, often traditional elites was crystallized during the course of 
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colonial rule, and that these traditional elites and oligarchies which manifested 
themselves in the modern state have proven to be extremely enduring and surviving. 
Looking to the Africanist literature on the continuities of rural/local despotism, van 
Klinken (2002) in particular3 has developed a comparable argument in relation to the 
current process of decentralization in Indonesia and argues that the obstacles to 
democracy are found not only in Jakarta with the central state actors, but also, or 
perhaps more so at the local level. As with other colonial power, the Dutch ruled 
through local elites, and incorporated them into their system of rule. This patterns of 
indirect rule practiced by the Dutch colonials, was prolonged by local big men (orang 
besar) particularly in rural areas who later have promoted their own role as citizens, 
while reinforcing the subject-role among their local clients. From this system of 
indirect rule in which the Dutch clearly institutionalized and separated the role of 
“traditional elites” from that of for example the Chinese business classes, in stead 
incorporating the indigenous elite into the political bureaucracy. According to this 
argument this system of indirect rule laid the foundation for the paternalistic claims 
of aristocratic families to political monopoly in post-Suharto Indonesia.  
 
2.4.1 Democratic Institutions and Decentralization 
The next question that will be treated in this thesis is: How are dominant actors 
adapting to or making use of democratic institutions? and how should one interpret 
decentralization in relation to these changes? in order to say something about how 
elites who also make use of violence relate to democracy. Carrying on from previous 
discussion on the oligarchies of the political economy position, it is clear that the 
continuities of local elites in relation to decentralization processes involve in one way 
                                              
3 Mamdani (1996) talks of the post-colonial state as bifurcated in the sense that on the one hand there is the ‘civilised’ 
urban society that “grew out of a history of direct rule and now practices a form of democracy”, while on the other hand the 
patrimonial networks remain and the bifurcated character survives at the local level. In the African state the bifurcated 
power of the colonial legacy mediated racial domination through tribally organized local authorities, reproducing racial 
identity in citizens at the centre, and ethnic identity in subjects at the local level. In this bifurcated state, a decentralized 
customary despot comprises local government.  
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or the other the handling of political institutions, access to elected positions, and 
control over patronage networks in order to gain control over valuable resources.  
According to the transition paradigm discussed in the previous pages, for 
democracy “to become the only game in town” it is only a matter of getting the elites 
to “use” the institutions with the people controlling their access. Minimizing the state 
enterprise will make this process easier. A common critical argument when 
democracy ‘does not work’ is that because the same old elite that agreed to the 
crafting of democracy are still holding on to their economic and social assets (despite 
giving up their formal political positions) they are able to avoid or at least undermine 
most of the new instruments of democracy (Demos 2004: 34). If the elites in speaking 
are one the other hand making use of the democratic instruments, working through 
politics, democracy is working its way (ibid: 35). The successful carrying out of 
elections has led many observers to draw this conclusion that democracy is on its 
way. In a critical light however, according to Demos (2004) (supporting the central 
arguments of Nordholt, van Klinken, and Sidel) it seems that dominant actors 
actually tend to play the democratic game. In stead of bypassing the rules they “bend 
and abuse” them to their own advantage. Thus, according to Demos one should talk 
of elites that has hijacked and monopolized the instruments of democracy and made it 
into an “oligarchic democracy”. This line of reasoning is supported by the argument 
that the legacy of indirect rule and the accumulation of primitive accumulation are 
impacting on how dominant actors/local elites relate to democratic institutions. 
Capital is accumulated mostly through political and essentially coercive instruments 
of power that were introduced through colonial indirect rule (DEMOS 2005: 35). 
The main determinants of power structures at the local level are national-level 
state structures and local political economy. Local elites and strongmen are shaped by 
the opportunities and constraints for accumulation and monopolization of local 
economic and political power which are provided by both micro-and macro structures 
of the state (Sidel 2004). In a comparative analysis on democratization and bossism in 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, Sidel (2004) argues that there are important 
divergent patterns in the way local elites in the three settings operate and function in 
relation to the institutional framework available to them. While the system of direct 
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elections and accompanied unrestricted powers of mayors, governors, and 
congressmen in the Philippines and MPs in Thailand “the system of elected offices 
found in Indonesia is much less hospitable to the concentration of power in the hands 
of a single boss or dynasty” (ibid.: 113). As long as the positions of gubernur and 
walikota (mayor) are elected members of their local assemblies in stead of directly 
elected by the residents, would-be bosses are kept in check by institutional measures. 
As a result Indonesia is witnessing the fragmentation of local elites who are fighting 
to gain access to seats in the local assemblies (DPRD). According to this argument 
dominant actors are by and large formally adhering to democracy and institutional 
constraints do not necessarily lead to more democracy, but can serve to frame a 
specific manner of elite constellation.   
The particular way democratic combined with long traditions for despotic rule 
at the local level is closely related to the questions of how one should interpret 
decentralization. What theoretical arguments are found in the debates on violence 
that counter the hypothesis on decentralization?  
As discussed above the theoretical foundations for decentralization is that it 
will serve to bring power closer to the people and that the people will more easily 
gain access to the politics that concern them. It is also assumed that decentralization 
will lead to democratization and the rise of civil society (see Aspinall and Fealy 
2003). In one of the few analyses on the center-periphery relations in the late New 
Order Indonesia, Malley said that “so long as regional government remains 
accountable upward and inward to the center rather than downward and outward to 
the indigenous population, local grievances are likely to go unaddressed and local 
unrest is likely to continue” (Malley 1999: 97). The argument here is that violence 
(read ethnic conflict) will secede when local government is de-linked from the center 
and linked to the community. However, without necessarily invalidating Malley’s 
assumptions in its entirety, de-linking of local from central politics does not 
automatically mean better accountability and representation at the local level.  
To understand local dynamics there is a vast and interesting literature on the 
links between crime and politics in Indonesia and elsewhere. As Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou have said about the African state “decentralization and regionalization 
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recommended by enthusiasts of good governance and civil society can entail the 
consequences that political authorities will use criminal networks to maintain or 
revive power”. In the context of patrimonial systems of rule, electoral politics will 
multiply the opportunity for this kind of mediation (Bayart et.al 1999).  
In this historical perspective, the political trajectories of the colonial legacy of 
indirect rule are perpetuated in such a way that the bureaucracy acquires command in 
a specific territory, and in the networks of influence and clientelism that constitutes 
the post-colonial state. This creates structural predisposition for criminal activity and 
violence. In the broad debate on the genealogy of violence in Indonesia, the 
symbiosis of crime and politics has always been highlighted (see Rafael 1999, 
Nordholt and Till 1999, Lev 1999). 
In a development perspective the symbiosis between crime and politics is 
driven forward by primitive accumulation of capital. In Indonesia the boundaries 
between state, society, and the market, and between formal and informal institutions 
and networks and between the center and periphery are more blurred than many 
expect (Nordholt 2004: 43-44). It is thus not only a question of whether the state is 
able to provide ample security against crime and violence, but also to what extent the 
state itself forms an essential part of the criminal structures. Whether the police or the 
military is able to provide ample security depends highly on willingness and ability of 
various groups of elites to adhere to the rules of the democratic game.  
While liberal pluralists do not recognize the concept of ‘state’ and prefer to 
deal with ‘government’ and the institutions of the bureaucracy (Robison et. al 2004: 
17), Weberians define the state as much by its monopoly on coercion as the way in 
which it is driven by the institutional interests of its officials (Skocpol 1985). In this 
respect the role and implication of the informal on the formal requires that the state 
be seen not only in relation to its institutional value, but as an organic system of 
power defined not only on its own, but also in terms of these various dynamics that 
define the parameters of politics. 
Linking this perspective to the debate on crime and politics in Indonesia, the 
debate has been more focused on particular continuities than in structures making 
connection between the state and crime applicable. Again, this is because crime, in 
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the same way as violence was seen as a correlating factor to the authoritarian regime: 
there was a natural symbiosis between crime and politics because the regime and its 
politicians were criminals. This is not something to disagree upon, but is nevertheless 
not very fruitful when analyzing the current trends of violence that exist against a 
backdrop of democratic reform. In face of competition over elected positions, 
dominant actors continuously depend on forming relations with a criminal 
underworld.  
 
2.5 The Actually Existing Civil Society  
The final point is that because paramiltairies and militias are organizations in their 
own right, attached to social/religious organizations and political parties with some 
sort of ideological or mobilizational role. Their mother organizations are often read as 
parts of a “civil society” (see Hefner 2000), while they still protect and depend on 
their paramilitary wings. Several essential factors are neglected in the assumptions of 
a “civil society”. The dichotomy of civil society as an opposite of the state is 
problematic for a number of reasons. Not only does it serve to idealize civil society, 
but it also assumes a zero-sum relationship between state and society that in turn puts 
a seal on further exploration of the ambiguous relationship between the two. First the 
civil society that actually exists is a locus of a range of political and social 
orientations based on ethnicity, gender, religion, that are symptomatic of the specific 
intricate sets of power and domination in society  (see for example Kumar 1993). 
This emphasis on the bad state versus the good civil society ignores that internal 
structures and practices of the autonomous organization can be both undemocratic 
and uncivil. The dichotomy also ignores the intricate relationship between dominant 
actors, stake holders, and their impact on society and way of interacting with society. 
In rapidly industrializing Asian countries, new challenges have changed both the 
economic landscape and cultural outlook. With democratic reforms accompanied by 
decentralization programs the relationship between state and society has been altered, 
but it does not mean that the liberalist idea of a civil society does not impact on social 
change, or if it does that it is the most dominant stake holder on the political, 
economic, and social arena.  
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The problem remains of how one should interpret other forces in society that 
are not necessarily fulfilling the criterion for what is “civil society”.  A useful 
prospect is to look at ‘what’s really there’ in terms of “social forces” that represent 
“powerful mechanisms for associative behavior” (Migdal 2001: 107). Social forces 
thus encompass both informal (patron-client networks) and formal organizations 
(religious communities, business groups etc.). The capabilities of social forces to 
exercise power comes from their relative ability to make advantage of the available 
resources, ability to generate symbols to which people develop attachments, as well 
as the relative efficiency of the organization (as in hierarchies) (ibid). One crucial 
dimension is however, that no social organization, whether formal or informal 
operate in a vacuum. Leaders (patrons, village chiefs, clerics, politicians, 
businessmen, landlords etc) will mobilize followers and exercise power when and if 
other social forces are doing the same. The focus should thus be on the 
“environments” of domination and opposition where the various “social forces” 
engage over material and symbolic issues, “vying for supremacy through struggles 
and accommodations, clashes and coalitions (Ibid; 107-108). Some people will use 
social forces to dominate others (through various means of coercion or symbolic 
efforts, or democratic means to promote policy), or to avoid domination by others.  
 
2.6 Summing up the Theoretical Arguments  
The above discussion had elaborated on the limitations of two dominant strands of 
democratization theories, the one emphasizing pact making between soft-and hard 
liners within the regime in order to initiate a democratic transition, and the other the 
neo-liberal agenda of transition which focuses on the need to decentralize the state 
and strengthen civil society. These positions are rooted in general perspective on 
democratization do not sufficiently explain the political realities. An implicit factor in 
both these approaches is that violence is seen a by-product of the authoritarian 
regime, and inherently connected to the predatory state, and therefore a phenomenon 
that will be dismantled with successful democratization. The chapter sought to frame 
contextual tools/arguments that can explain the research question: why violence? The 
theoretical foundation for the thesis is thus the juxtaposition certain explanatory 
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causal variables in the democratization paradigm with selected arguments in the 
discussion on violence. One position which seeks to criticize the democratic reforms 
that have been implemented in Indonesia, especially the neo-liberal agenda of the 
World Bank, are those rooted in political economy. Despite expansive discussions on 
the role and function of the Indonesian oligarchs, this position is limited in explaining 
the persistence of violence primarily because it evades a number of arguments such 
as the how elites actually relate to democratic instruments of power, what historical 
trajectories beyond the mere oligarchcic potential if the New Order, and the actual 
dynamics which actually shapes the mobilization and formation of violence groups.   
Arguments rooted in historical interpretations tracing structural changes and 
continuities offer tools arguably better suited the contextual realities. First, an 
understanding of violence necessitates outlining the trajectory of local elites and local 
despotism, arguing that the formation of despotic rule can only be interpreted within 
such a framework. Secondly, the chapter juxtaposes the assumption that adhering to 
the democratic game means that democracy is working. The contextual tools argued 
better suited to explain violence, is analyzing the system of primitive capital 
accumulation and how dominant actors are shaped by the opportunities and 
constraints resulting from the introduction of democratic institutions. Thirdly, in the 
context of heightened competition and local despotic rule, decentralization may imply 
a decentralization of violence and corruption. Finally, one cannot understand violence 
in Indonesia without analyzing the social forces representing the means of violence. 
after all violence is perpetrated by groups in civil society relating to legitimate 
political parties and social organizations.  This thesis seeks to illuminate the 
structures that make violence still a relevant problem in the Indonesian context, 
despite the success of democratic reform. The above discussion has sought to draw 
out variables that may help explain the ‘paramilitary puzzle’. 
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3. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
The thesis aims at a qualitative approach to the study of violence in Indonesia. The 
choice of methodology depends on the specific demands of the problems and 
questions the thesis aims at answering. 
The research question necessitates a case study approach in that it sets its focus 
on “why” and “how” certain political structures and dynamics are shaped, aiming at 
specific contextual understanding of a broader problem (see Yin 1994, Kvale 1997). 
Furthermore, the case study allows for a variety of techniques in collecting the 
material. The case study is concerned with the overall structure and dynamic of 
violence within one particular country. There are three particular considerations 
integral for the success of a single-case study design: the case has to be critical with 
regards to existing theoretical frameworks, the case is unique, or revealing a 
particular phenomenon. The starting point for this case study is the implementation of 
democratic reform against the backdrop of a broad and dominant discussion on 
violence in Indonesia. The more critical discussion on the dominant democratization 
paradigms directing democratic reform in developing countries is a general one, 
while the discussion on violence is a contextual one. The case of Indonesia is 
revealing a particular phenomenon that is intriguing for students of democracy.  
 
3.1 Sources 
There is an abundant literature on democratization, local politics, and violence in 
Indonesia. The information is based on a triangulation of sources between secondary 
sources and primary sources, which in turn enhances data’s reliability (Yin 1994). 
The use of secondary material and theoretical discussion lays the foundation for both 
analytical discussions, and the forms the basis for interpreting the environment and 
power relations within which violence exists. In order to carry out this kind of study 
it is necessary with a well-founded and extensive empirical and theoretical foundation 
based a vast range of historical, cultural, and social research. It is this literature that 
lays the basis for choice of research questions and the direction and content of the 
field-work. 
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The thesis is based on interviews conducted in Indonesia during three months 
from August-October 2004 in Central Java (Yogyakarta, Solo and nearby rural areas), 
Jakarta, and Bogor. The aim of the field-work was to evaluate the specific role and 
implications of dominant violence groups, the way politicians and other dominant 
actors related to them, and how and when violence is a tool or part of broader 
structure, or both.  
The most important and demanding task was to grasp the precarious dynamics 
between the various arenas for political activity, such as the separation of activity 
within formal or informal or political or non-political arenas, as well as various 
arenas for power related to domination by various types of actors. This could not be 
done without continuous reference to secondary material, as observing such 
phenomenon without an extensive in depth study of all actors involved was 
impossible to carry out. Naturally when discussing on a sensitive topic such as 
violence, elite implications, and patron-client systems, it is difficult to collect the 
information needed from the actors involved.  
 Due to limited resources, it was impossible to carry out an extensive broad-
based study on the nature and implication of violence-groups in Indonesia. A 
compromise was made, between interviewing as many of the real actors as possible 
(politicians, militia members, satgas-members), and support or extend the information 
collected from these with information from experts among NGO-activists and 
academics. The information collected directly from the actors was limited and at 
times difficult to verify, and so cross-checking information with expert informants 
ensured reliability of the information collected. At other times, conversations with 
experts helped both selecting the relevant actors for interviews as well as formulate 
relevant and constructive questions. In this respect, the experts often functioned as 
key-informants providing necessary practical and analytical information. All 
interviews were semi-structured, with a concrete theme and a set of context-specified 
questions. All interviews were carried out in an informal conversational manner. The 
politicians preferred to have their interviews at their office at the DPRD or the party 
office, while most other interviews took place at the informants’ homes, in a warung 
(street café), or on the street corner. Especially with the actors (varying from high-
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ranking politicians to low-level members), the interviews required a level of 
sensitivity and acquired naivety to create a level of trust. This allowed the respondent 
to provide a fresh commentary about the topic (see Yin 1994: 90-91). This type of 
interview required a great deal of preparation and probing in advance about the 
personal history and position of the interview-object etc. Key informants were mostly 
able to provide this kind of information prior to the interview.  
In addition, a lot of valuable information was gathered from short conversations 
with satgas or preman in the hallway while waiting for an agreed meeting with a 
politician, at the election rally, or in the street. Such conversations/interviews would 
typically last from 10 to 30 minutes, centering on who they were and what they did, 
and their thoughts about politics. In review these informal semi-focused interviews 
provided the most valuable information for understanding and grasping the the 
function, realities and conditionalities for militia-and security group members. In 
certain settings, ordinary people would also express their opinion about militias, or 
talk about their own experiences and/or problems with militias (in their 
neighborhood, regarding their business etc). With regard to this last group of 
informants, the mastering of the vernacular was essential in order to gather 
information on the whole picture. Being able to speak to people in an informal setting 
in their own language created a special level of trust. The role as an outsider allowed 
for probing into issues in a manner that would normally not have been accepted 
behavior for a girl.  
During interviews and conversations with various actors a number of variables 
were touched upon that concerned the specific role and function of the militias in 
speaking. When discussing with members of various militias or political parties, the 
discussion rarely centered on the topic of violence as such, but rather on the 
organizational structures of their political grouping, and their relative attachment to 
certain political parties of other community figures. Although they might be less 
willing to share information about their own patrons, they would often share this 
information about other groups. The discussions have allowed for the development of 
an analysis of the type of cultural and social attributes that accompanied membership 
or attachment to a certain group, and the way in which they view themselves as actors 
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in the political and economic arena. Although it is possible to evaluate the actual 
links between formal and informal (political) groups, there are concepts attached to 
the overall research question that are not directly observable. For example are 
perceptions of power structures and behavior open to diverse interpretations. As 
Harriss-White notes “power cannot be measured…but has to be observed mainly 
through the vicarious processes of conversing about it” (1999; 27). In this respect 
conversations with experts on the outside amongst NGO activists and academics 
proved a valuable source to validate information, broaden the perspective from the 
local to the national, and from the personal to the general.  
 
3.2 Reliability and Validity 
First, the concept of reliability demonstrates that the data collection procedures can 
be repeated, and with the same results (ibid.). The goal of reliability is to minimize 
the biases and errors in a study. The case study design of combining field work with 
empirical and theoretical readings, another researcher would be able to arrive at the 
same conclusions. 
Assessing validity of the date is concerned with assessing the relevance of the 
data and information used for contextual analysis. The overall quality of the research 
design depends on whether the information is trustworthy, credible, and confirmable 
(Yin 1994: 33). Establishing correct operational measures, ensuring construct 
validity, can be problematic in case studies as the selection of variables may at times 
be interpreted as subjective, rather than objective. To achieve construct validity one 
should assess the performance of indicators in relation to causal hypotheses. The use 
of multiple sources combined with field work enhances construct validity in this 
study. This leads on to the problem of determining external validity, which deals with 
the problem of knowing whether the findings and conclusions are generalizable 
beyond the immediate case study (Yin 1994: 37). In this study, the case is Indonesia., 
although field work was only carried out in Central and West Java, with a main focus 
in urban areas. The study is based on a theoretical discussion, and it is this theoretical 
discussion that produce arguments which structure the discussions and drawing of 
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conclusions. The arguments and conclusions can be generalizable only in light of the 
theoretical discussion.  
Internal validity refers to whether one can establish a causal relationship between 
variables. Theoretically, this thesis leans on historical and structural arguments to 
which the aim is to highlight historical continuities determining certain structures and 
dynamics explaining violence today. The concern over internal validity is this 
problem of making inferences as the study deals with unobservable historical events. 
The historical interpretation is based on selective readings of historical narratives and 
analytical texts, making it possible to distinguish selective trends based on this broad 
reading. Internal validity is ensured in the thesis by continually underlining the 
empirical and structural basis for drawing conclusions.  
The technique used to ensure tenability of the selected arguments is related 
“process tracing” in case study research as a method for identifying and testing causal 
mechanisms (Bennet 1997). As historical arguments form an essential part of the 
selection of variables and relevant arguments to answer the research question. This 
kind of process tracking seek to find correlating variables, testing out what variables 
are more important than others in explaining the phenomenon of violence in the 
democratic era in Indonesia.  
 
3.3 Structuring the Thesis  
The thesis is divided into three chapters each discussing relevant arguments and 
perspectives that explain the persistence of violence since 1998. The thesis is 
structured around the arguments presented and discussed in the previous chapter, first 
focusing on the particularities of the Indonesian context, discussing the changing 
trends and structures defining of the local elites and the role of predatory politics, and 
secondly the particular set of which violence has been perpetrated by civilian 
violence groups as defined by their relationship to the state. The next chapter treats 
this theme in relations to changing realities in Indonesia after the introduction of 
democratic reform and decentralization, while the final chapter looks at changing 
realities for violence groups in the post-Suharto period. The conclusion seeks to 
combine these three dimensions.  
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4. THE PARTICULARITIES OF INDONESIA: HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
 
Tracking political changes and dynamics demand a selective narrative of the 
historical context in order to trace any particular trajectory. As this chapter will 
illustrate there are important continuities and discontinuities in the ways violence 
groups have been organized, mobilized and assimilated into political power struggles 
that are highly relevant for understanding the dynamics of local elites- and violence 
groups today. The arguments rooted in political economy do not provide ample 
picture of the particularities of the Indonesian trajectory and the accompanying 
realities for explaining the dynamics and structures of a system in which violence is 
commonplace. In stead, a selective reading history, pulling out the essential evidence 
in order to trace certain continuities and discontinuities. A periodization of 
Indonesian history is useful to be able to highlight important turning points. The 
chapter highlights the metamorphosis of certain features of state and social power and 
the continuities of others that makes violence organizations endemic by answering 
the questions: What are the historical roots of state and elite dynamics creating 
despotic structures, and secondly how has popular violence been crystallized at 
specific times in history?  First, the focus is directed at the colonial period, looking at 
local elites and the contriving forces defining this group and then discussing the 
colonial relationship and dealings with crime. Secondly, the most violent events in 
Indonesian post-colonial history, the revolution and the 1965-66 massacres is 
discussed. The relationship between the New Order local elites and the state is briefly 
elaborated on before moving on to analyzing the link between the regime’s security 
policies, crime, and civilian mobilization into violence groups. An appreciation of 
these distinctive features is essential for observers in order to outline the structures 
that uphold violence as a part of the political process and game, also in relation to 
democracy.  
 
4.1 The Colonial State Project 
Much of the changes introduced to the archipelago that was to become Indonesia 
must be viewed in light of the trajectory shaped by the colonial impasse. The colonial 
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state went through shifting periods with regards to expansion depending much on the 
global trends. The Dutch colonial regime was one characterized by violence. From 
1871 to 1910, thirty two colonial wars were waged on the archipelago which was to 
become Indonesia (Nordholt 2002: 36). The twentieth centry has in the colonial 
literature been referred to the period of the Ethical Policy during which “not 
exploitation, but moral and material elevation of the native is the predominant theme” 
(ibid.). Despite this ‘higher cause’ of colonial rule, besides the hot spots such as Ache 
where the Cutch fought several bloody wars, the people of the archipelago was 
subjected to systematic violence and abuse by their colonial rulers (Ibid: 36-46). The 
following few paragraphs will first highlight the role and nature of local elites under 
colonial rule, to then move on to look how colonial rulers dealt with crime.    
4.1.1 Local Elites  
The first and most obvious particularity that deserves attention is the development 
and integration of elites into the modern Indonesian state. The peculiar patterns of 
segregation and incorporation of local elites into the state in which the intricate 
systems of patron-client relations were incorporated into the modern (modernizing) 
state date back to the Dutch colonial era. While, in pre-colonial society, in the 
absence of a strong state prior to the expansion of the colonial bureaucracy, the 
underlying pattern in all kinds of social organization was based on localized patron-
client bonds. The most common way to become attached to a patron was by building 
up dept, creating a mutual dependency relation between the ruler and the ruled, 
providing security for both patron and client (van Klinken 2004: 83-84, Reid 1988: 
20-28).  
The system of indirect rule that came to define the way Dutch colonial powers 
ruled the archipelago after the demise of the Dutch East India Company 
institutionalized the patrimonialism as the system of rule and so a system of natural 
inequality was institutionalized at all levels. The colonial powers manifested their 
superiority through their moral codes for behavior and the building of institutions for 
which to govern the indigenous peoples. The hierarchical differences between people 
were given a legitimizing moral basis in terms of the institutionalizing and 
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manifestation of racial segregation between colonizers and colonized on the one 
hand, and the linking of these differences to the indigenous social hierarchies on the 
other (van Klinken 2004: 84). The type of state that evolved was thus both shaped by 
indigenous social forces at the same time as colonial perceptions of the indigenous 
society was appropriated by the local aristocratic elites (ibid. 2004: 85). 
The colonial expansion of the modern bureaucracy necessarily enhanced the 
role of the state as a source of power and income. The nobles, belonging to the social 
segment known as priyayi in Java, functioned as the state representative in the 
regions aspiring to the highest administrative position of the bupati. The expansion of 
the bureaucratic state, particularly after the introduction of the Ethical Policy in 1901, 
meant that the Javanese priyayis took on administrative positions in other places in 
the archipelago, making state resources an increasingly valuable asset for indigenous 
rulers (ibid). On that note, the opportunities for maintaining the system of 
patrimonialism between indigenous rulers and their clients was reinforced by the 
delimitation of administrative boundaries tracing considerable continuity with the late 
19th century district boundaries. Outside Java, these smallest units that traced those of 
the indigenous rulers, were the ones to became the official administrative unit in the 
colonial bureaucracy.  
Through posts in the bureaucracy, the local elites could manifest their position 
and rule through their patron-client networks. In the colonial realities of delineated 
indigenousness, definitions of boundaries, and the labeling of one’s own identity 
meant that ethnic identities were reinvented using pre-colonial and European 
bureaucratic material with indigenous rulers as the key link. As one observer points 
out points out: “the considerable enthusiasm with which local elites in the hundreds 
of small second level regional governments (kabupaten) have reacted to the Regional 
Autonomy Laws of 1999 demonstrates that these units retain mobilizational potential 
for them often of an ethnic kind” (van Klinken 2004: 88).  
An important point concerning the nature of the state is that the patrimonial 
networks these local elites exercised under colonial rule is not a necessary alternative 
to a weak state when no other alternative existed, but a preferred model that since 
colonial rule has reinforced despotic rule by local elites in the regions. In the 
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provinces, these patronage networks still provide the main access route to state 
resources. The local aristocracies around the archipelago, which in essence were 
discouraged from taking part in any kind of commercial activities, were in stead 
encouraged to cultivate the cultural trappings of traditional rule. In order to transform 
the local aristocrats into proper civil servants in the colonial bureaucracy, the Dutch 
began to promote modern secular education. Interestingly prominence of the priyayi 
was also reflected in their leadership of the proto-nationalist movements in the early 
decades of the 20th century. Their dominance expanded to leadership of some local 
versions of the revolution in the late 1940s, and the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) 
in the 1950s and the 1960s.  
 
4.1.2 Policing the Colonial State: The Genealogy of the Criminal  
The colonial state project was one of introducing the rule of law, and connected to 
this rationalizing crime and punishment. Almost universally in the colonial world, 
any practical distinction between the task of conducting public affairs and the 
institutional and unbridled use of violence and coercion was virtually non-existent. 
The institutions for carrying out violence, and the means of punishments were 
introduced as a response to dissidence, rebellions, or simply to seize power. As long 
as crime concerned only the community, and not colonial interests or the interests of 
the state, putting down crime and criminality remained the responsibility of the 
community. In 1872 a colonial tobacco planter Amand contradicted the colonial 
picture of the Javanese peasant community as a “palladium of peace” by pointing out 
that cattle theft, extortion, opium smuggling, violence, and intimidation occurred 
daily (Nordholt 2002: 39). The man responsible for such violence was the jago. In the 
village, the jago was a man who had achieved high status by both his charismatic 
nature and his ways of intimidating and controlling the people around him. In pre-
colonial society, the gang leader was often recognized as a local headman rather than 
being suppressed. The jago thus refers to a category of local strongmen to whom 
violence was a means to achieve high status and gain access to resources. As Amand 
wrote in his report: “no headman considers his village complete and in good order if 
it does not have at least one thief, often several, who are under the command of the 
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oldest and cleverest thief, who is called jago” (ibid). This figure of the jago draws the 
staple for the heroic status for the lawbreaker in the village whose figure developed 
into a sort of popular figurehead in opposition to colonial rule. The perpetrators of 
crime in the archipelago have been characterized as the symbol of societal opposition 
to injustices perpetrated by the predatory agents of the colonial state. The more 
contemporary Indonesian criminal type, preman is of the same type as the criminal 
jago of the colonial era, but with opportunity, the preman can also become a political 
leader. A preman is not an ordinary thief, but a person who exhorts an aura of 
independence concerned with cultivating the space of his own extortive activities. 
The Petrus affair of the 1980s when criminals were ganged up and killed by 
underground army officers as part of the regime’s crack down on crime at the same 
time as in some ways getting control over unwanted elements of crime.  
A standardized police force was not to be established until the turn of the 
twentieth century. Until then the villages and native urban quarters were policed by 
volunteer neighborhood watches, known as ronda who “routinely treated suspected 
thieves, burglars, and other undesirables with vigilante violence” (Anderson 2001: 
10). In the plantation areas, it was most common for the administrators to go into 
alliance with the local criminal, assorted groups of plantation guards, and the 
personal bullies of the administrators. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia people’s 
livelihoods were continuously threatened by both visible and invisible dangers 
(Nordholt 2002: 35).  
 
4.2 Civilian Mobilization; From Revolution to Massacre  
The following few paragraphs merit attention to the specific circumstance and nature 
of two violent periods in Indonesian history: the revolutionary battle for 
independence in the 1940s, and the massacres of communists in 1965-66. With the 
advantage of hindsight to other discussants on the themes, the reading of the material 
is done with reference to the current-day dynamics of violence-groups and political 
mobilization. 
Since de Tocqueville, scholars have argued that the possibilities for collective 
action within the sphere of civil society are influenced more or less decisively by the 
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particular types of dominant regimes (see Skocpol and Goodwin 1989). These types 
of arguments typically focus on the implementation in a historical perspective of 
political institutions that serve to structure the overall parameters of everyday politics, 
as well as the short-term significance of internal regime tensions in cracking the 
armor of the state apparatus during moments of uncertainty. The parameters for 
everyday politics by the mid-1940s was defined very much along the lines of vague 
political associations mobilized along the lines of the Japanese military units standing 
up against a weakened colonial power returning after years of war.   
The rapid changes of the previous decades had created deep social tensions in 
the colony, but had not shaken colonial stability. Under the Japanese occupation from 
1941-45, thousands of youths were organized into political, military and paramilitary 
movements, anticipating the day when the enemy would bring the war directly into 
the archipelago. These formed the basis for the very same movements that ran the 
Revolution from their autonomous positions. The most important for these auxiliary 
movements, The Fatherland Defense Force, Peta, would from 1945 onwards until the 
late 1970s, provide the bulk of officers for the army of the revolutionary Republic of 
Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). The Japanese crystallized a 
powerful self-consciousness among these mobilized youths (Anderson 1972: 2), 
providing the much needed space for opposition. While pre-war nationalism was 
limited to the politically minded youth in the 1930s, the Japanese created the 
inclusive heightened mobilization force so integral to the character of the revolution. 
As one rated observer of the events has said: “Partly by accident and partly by intent, 
the Japanese accelerated a profound transformation of values that had begun in the 
late Dutch colonial time” (Anderson 2001:11).  
There is no doubt that what has come to be known as the Indonesian 
revolution (revolusi) was a legitimate battle for independence against an occupying 
force after the demise of the Japanese Imperial Army in 1945 and the return of the 
Allied forces. The most striking feature of the revolution period was the level of 
heightened mobilization around primarily the nationalist cause, but wrapped up in 
religious, cultural, and military-style attires. Gangs of revolutionary youngsters 
competed for the heads of aristocrats while they attacked and killed on seemingly 
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random basis suspected marketers, traitors, or spies. Well-known gangsters became 
revolutionaries, prostitutes formed women’s militias, and boys from pesantren- 
schools became mujahedin and formed in militias under leadership of politically 
active Muslim teachers. Children and teen-agers left the school benches to join 
associations like the Indonesian Socialist Youth, Wild Tigers, the Dare-To-Die 
League, the Black Dragons and so on (Anderson 2001: 13). The members were a mix 
of peasant kids and petty criminals. The battle for independence was very much a 
product of combining forces of anti-colonialism, mass organization and criminality. 
Apart from the urban young nationalists, the revolution was run from its autonomous 
positions by local leaders, often gangsters or preman who expanded their domain 
through their organizational networks. They seized arsenals of Japanese weapons or 
their competitors, or simply armed themselves with what was available; daggers, 
knifes and machetes from the village (Anderson 2001: 11-13). One could not 
differentiate between youth groups, militias, and the army. In many instances, they 
were one and the same thing. The roles became mixed up, as the gangster became a 
heroic fighter, and the child a warrior. With the alteration of state authority, the 
power of criminal figures rose and fell (Cribb 1991: 2). It was at this crucial juncture 
in history that was the founding years of the Indonesian state that these elements 
became aligned with an entirely new ‘nation’ - ‘Indonesia’.  
The prestige of this sustained explosion of patriotic popular violence is what 
still echoes into Indonesia’s present. At that time as much as today, a popular demand 
for independence and democracy was mixed and ingrained with the various social 
forces at play, contradicting the themes of categorization and specific location for 
violence.  
The period of democratic experiments that followed the bloody years of the 
revolution, structured many of the dominant themes and trends for ideological 
clustering and political conflict that ring familiar in the post-1998 era. That said, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze the aborted attempts at democratization of 
the 1950s apart from a few crucial points. Viewed from a comparative regional 
perspective the Indonesian Left mobilized quite early and very strongly. In the 
context of the immediate post-revolution parliamentary democracy the Partai 
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Komunis Indonesia (PKI) grew especially powerful and its affiliated organizations 
numbered some 27 million members in the late 1950s (Hedman 2001: 94). The 
period was characterized by the institutionalization of political parties and the 
strengthening of an Indonesian national army and navy.  
While the heroism of revolusi has selectively incorporated into the Indonesian 
collective memory, the 1965 massacres have been hidden and covered up as part of 
the New Order propaganda machinery. Intervention in current day Indonesian 
discourse is however, the opening up of the sealed off memories of the 1965-66 
killings (in some places it lasted until 1967-69) as part of the increased focus on 
human rights abuses during the New Order. In nuanced ways the recurring violence 
in Indonesia has prompted many to show the events of 1965-66 as part of a national, 
regional, and transnational history of a longer colonial and postcolonial duree (see 
Vickars 1998, Zarbuchen 2002, Törnquist 2003, Stoler 2002, Cribb 2002), rather than 
only as the beginning of the type of regime that was to come.  
The bloody defeat of the Indonesian Left, entailed remarkably massive 
violence and very sudden repression, which had a profound and lasting impact on 
Indonesian society (see Robinson 1995, Törnquist 2000). Very little is still known 
about the massacres, particularly with regard to the local dynamics. The internment, 
torture and mass killings of more between half – one million alleged members of 
what was, prior to 1965 a legal part of Indonesia’s political landscape, the PKI and its 
affiliated unions and organizations, laid out the foundations on which the New Order 
regime was built. On the line of variations, anti PKI mobilization that took place in 
the urban areas prominently involved right-wing student groups affiliated with 
Muslim, Christian, and secular organizations (Hedman 2001:944, ). In rural areas it 
was mostly traditional Muslim landowners or other types of class related groups that 
mobilized against the alleged supporters of the PKI. 
The massacres turned on the mobilization of anti-PKI groups in society rather 
than on any discernible military counterinsurgency strategy, although the army took 
part in much of the killing as well. While large sectors of the armed forces were 
either unwilling or unable to uphold the state’s monopoly on violence, separate and 
highly dispersed militias, thugs and militants carried out the killings from their local 
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positions. Nothing was perhaps more striking than the role played by these private 
youth groups, mostly affiliated with other political parties or religious organizations. 
These local groups were in no way accidental or a “spur of the moment” (Törnquist 
2003: 7) as they have been, wrongfully so, characterized by critics inside the New 
Order regime, nor were they new inventions of the dispersed locally organized 
military units who thought it an efficient way to carry out mass killings of leftists 
(ibid.). The license to kill was handed out locally, and so the violence itself was both 
decentralized and privatized in a manner much relevant for the current debates on 
decentralization reform in Indonesia. In a manner of speaking the killings were fired 
up under and subcontracted to the actually existing civil society organizations at the 
time. By mobilizing through the various social organizations, in particular religious 
ones, which had become much more institutionalized and politically stable by the 
1960s than during the revolution represented a broadening of the channels through 
which certain sections of the elite could draw their powers. The massacres 
represented the need of certain social forces controlled and mobilized by these elites, 
to weaken a large group in society that seemed to be building extensive 
mobilizational strength. 
The effects of the massacres were devastating. In the same manner as during 
the revolution the period was characterized by extreme suspicion and fear. In 
Surabaya clogged canals had to be cleared for dead bodies, and by the end of the 
atrocities certain occupational groups such as teachers had been reduced drastically 
(Törnquist 2003: 5).  As opposed to other types of genocides, the atrocities were not 
based on extremist mass oriented ideologies like fascism or Stalinism, nor were they 
the result of the actions of a strong and dominant state ridding itself of “unwanted 
elements”. On a comparative note, the 1994 Rwandan genocide was carried out in a 
similar fashion by various types of lightly armed militias. It was, however, not the 
result of a weak and fragile state unable to control its people, as some analysts have 
proposed, but rather the result of a strong and far-reaching state able to organize and 
include broad sectors of society in the actual carrying out of the killings (Allen 1999, 
Mamdani 1996).  
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The attention for Indonesia should be put on how the massacres so markedly 
changed the forms of social organization within one generation (van Langenberg 
1990: 62, Vickers 2002: 783). Not only did the massacres eliminate any form of 
radical political potential, they also promoted a certain kind of organizational 
landscape that is still dominant today. One need only look at the historical lineages of 
the largest Muslim association in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) whose 
affiliated youth group, Banser was directly involved in the atrocities.4 In a historical 
perspective until this point in time, violence had always been decentralized and 
privatized whether it was violence as a “necessary byproduct” of a just revolution or 
unlawful massacres of leftists who had done nothing wrong or broken any particular 
rules. The general state repressive measures and government attraction policies 
developed and deployed to defeat the organized Left, more easily discerned in the 
existing literature further contributed to the shaping of the current historical situation 
faced by would-be contenders for the ears and minds of civil –or not so civil- society.  
The above pages have traced the continuities of violence from two very 
different periods in Indonesian history. The 65-66 massacres represented the 
institutionalization of militias and paramilitary groups as part of the state’s control 
over the means of violence. Whereas the militias that fought the revolution had been 
dispersed and fragmented to a great variety of locally based groups, the massacres of 
leftists in 1965-66 was carried out by similar militias and paramilitary groups, locally 
organized, but in a context in which the army could command and control, and the 
new criminal boss moved towards the heart of the state.  
 
4.3 The New Order State 
The key to understanding political violence in the New Order is to see it as an 
integral part of New Order politics- and not as an unfortunate by-product. Indonesian 
politics and in particular elections served to distance the people from politics and as 
one long-time observer has said: “the New Order political processes were designed to 
                                              
4 Basner is the sub-group to Ansor, the youth group directly under NU auspices. Banser is still very much active, in essence 
performing as the paramilitary wing of NU (Interview Rizal Panggabean, UGM, (2004).  
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make sure people do not do all the things they might otherwise do in a participatory 
democracy” (Schwartz, 1994: 272). The culture of violence- often referred to as 
kebudayaan kekerasan has been a useful distraction from meaningful participation. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the reasons for the demise of the 
New Order regime, but a few points deserve attention before the discussion moves on 
to discussing the more relevant variables of elite formation and social organization. 
Beyond the aborted experiment with parliamentarian democracy under Sukarno in the 
1950s the nature of authoritarian rule that followed also reflected marked counter-
revolutionary origins, especially after the 1965 military coup that propelled Suharto 
into the presidency. The authoritarian regime under Suharto remained a hybrid of 
sorts combining the strongly personalistic and patrimonial tendencies with an 
institutionalized role in government for the armed forces (ABRI) and an elaborate set 
of pseudo-parliamentary bodies based on regular, albeit highly restricted elections. 
The regime balanced both direct violence and the threat of violent repression with 
more or less selective patronage rewards (Robison and Hadiz 2004). These rewards 
constituted civilian or military positions, business access, or control over natural 
resources in combination with political posts through the party machinery of Golkar. 
The regime also sought to institutionalize its claims to ‘democratic’ legitimacy by 
holding regular mass rallies and people’s celebrations in connection to the rituals of 
elections (see Pemberton 1994, Schwartz 1994). The carrying out of elections also 
served to manifest Suharto’s presidential authority vis-à-vis the military. The 
legitimacy question remained a central concern for the Suharto and his companions. 
After all the Indonesian military has never been able to rule in the same strict manner 
as the military in for example Latin America. And so it was the constant need to 
legitimize the New Order regime that upheld the dual function of military and civilian 
control. One of the most central tensions within the New Order regime was thus the 
particular mix of institutional power bases and the personal networks.  The hybrid 
nature of Suharto’s New Order prefigured internal regime tensions along two key 
fault lines in the years leading up to its demise in 1998. First, the entrenchment of the 
armed forces officers in provincial administration, parliamentary bodies, and various 
state enterprises and business ventures  inevitably gave rise to growing tensions 
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between the military as an institution and the president and his family (Hedman 2001: 
942-943, Current data on the Indonesian military). Second, there was an increasing 
fragmentation from within the regime with several fractions taking a firmer stand. 
This does not mean that there were two opposing sides, one pro-Suharto and one 
supporting the demonstrators in the street. With this in mind the following few 
paragraphs move on to discussing the dynamics of elite rule during the New order, 
arguing that these processes have served to strengthen, systemize, and despotism 
amongst local rulers and that these patterns define state-elite relations in very distinct 
patterns today.  
 
4.3.1 New Order Local Elites 
To keep up the pretence and image of legitimacy, pseudo-parliaments were regularly 
elected every five years also at the local level. Although their effective powers and 
prerogatives were limited, the system served to strengthen local elites who 
maintained their well established hold over the lower echelons of the civilian 
administration in return for support from support for pribumi, the indigenous 
Indonesian business class. The flow of developmental funds from the central 
government during the oil boom period enabled them to run a lucrative business as 
owners of plantations and salt-water fishponds, cement factories, private banks, 
construction companies, hotels and tourist resorts (Sidel 2004). They were faithful to 
and highly dependent on, the central government, and became the main power 
brokers and controllers in the areas they so skillfully governed. In other words local 
officials under Suharto rule, co-edited their roles as administrators and businessmen, 
and thus represented the continuation of the long established tradition in which 
aristocratic families owned land and conducted large scale trade and business, in an 
economic climate within which these traditionally based elites held the dual role as 
government officials and business-men.  
Unlike other Southeast Asian countries, the constellations of class in Indonesia 
have featured a domestic bourgeoisie dominated by a relatively small minority of 
stigmatized and largely segregated Chinese capitalists (McVey 1992).The Chinese 
who had dominated the domestic distribution and credit networks since colonial times 
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and had increasingly developed commercial ties within a larger Chinese diaspora, 
was one of the main beneficiaries of the economic regime of the New Order. This 
group of Chinese capitalists have achieved a sort of ‘pariah’ status in Indonesian 
political and economic realm, which in combination with official and unofficial anti-
Chinese discrimination have served to create a number two enemy to the state, a 
much easier target for military and political personnel when political opposition 
needed channelling (Sidel 2004, Hedman 2001). The position of the Chinese at the 
local level were of the same calibre, being able to do business, highly ingrained into 
the economic policies of the regime and thus dependent on its protection, but still in a 
position where they were not represented in the bureaucracy.  
One of the interesting and enduring particularities of the Indonesian context is 
the endurance of local despots. By the 1990s the local power brokers and civilian 
administrators became increasingly subordinated to military commanders. Local 
military commanders rotating within the archipelago retired in the regions and 
established mafia-like networks through marriage-alliances and business-partnerships 
with local elites. These networks existed as much based on coercion as on financial 
domination. In short, one can speak of “the formation of local mafias which often had 
their eye on such civilian positions as bupati, provincial secretary, or even gubernur” 
(Sidel 2004). By the mid-1990s, closing up on the fall of Suharto, the roles were so 
intertwined that one could not see a clear distinction between army officials, local 
administrators, and business owners of the type discussed above. They associated 
with social-political forces, often with criminals and gangsters, from the Suharto 
youth movement Pancasila Muda similar to those youth movements so dominant 
today which will be discussed in the final chapter of this study. These forces played a 
major role in suppressing social and political protests and strikebreaking as well as 
providing election related services to the Suharto regime. State institutions lacked the 
independency needed to generate funds of its own and so a substantial amount of the 
state income was generated by informal means. The Indonesian armed forces receive 
only 30 percent of their funds from the state, leaving the remaining 70 percent to be 
raised by independent means (Kingsbury 2004). Since the late 1980s, particularly in 
the provinces, military officials worked in tandem with criminal rackets and mafia, 
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most of the time providing room and business for these forces. Military commanders 
thus was (and still is) the key owners of a range of illegal business such as smuggling, 
resource extraction (logging in natural parks and mining), gambling, piracy, and 
robbery (ibid.). The greyer sources of financial support came from the running of 
security services and protection rackets for big companies and on smaller scales for 
individual shop owners and businessmen. In conclusion the above few paragraphs 
have briefly highlighted the particularity of local elite rule and dynamics during the 
New Order, with special emphasis on the way local despotic rule evolved as response 
to a strong state with small funds.  
 
4.3.2 New Order Security and Crime   
Most of the current-day civilian militias and paramilitary groups amidst the crowd of 
political parties and social organizations are rooted in the New Order period. Their 
self-enunciating and legitimized role as security proponents stem from the system of 
which the New Order state conformed traditional security measures and incorporated 
them into the state as part of officially sanctioned security apparatus.  After the 1965 
massacres, security became one of the central ideological programs for the New 
Order regime. The programs developed for policing and surveying the community 
pin point the particular way the regime dealt with criminals, crime, and security. 
Traditionally crucial decision regarding the community such taxes and property were 
made at regular meetings between village chiefs and community leaders at gathering 
points in the village, in Bali these are called banjar, while in Java they are called 
hansip. In The New Order government recognized the social importance of these 
traditional decision-making units, and so made it a vehicle for disseminating ideology 
and various development programs, at the same time as introducing laws to limit 
community involvement in village-decision making processes following up on 
colonial policies of officially separating between adat (traditional) and dinas 
(official) law (ICG 2003). In the same way as the Dutch had co-opted sasak noble 
houses in Lombok to serve as state representatives, Golkar was eager to co-opt local 
nobles, clerics and other community leaders into their mold. In Lombok by the 1971 
election, many left their traditional alliances in Masyumi and Nadhlatul Ulama, to 
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side with Golkar, reportedly as a sign of gratitude to Suharto for his role in destroying 
the PKI5. The central government successfully decreased the community’s potential 
for independent decision making (ibid.). As one observer has pointed out, the banjar 
in Bali became institutions for surveillance and supervision of residents, particularly 
those with communist backgrounds (Robinson1995: 274). In the 1980s the regime 
introduced “security” and “fighting crime” as a regime policy, and did through 
various measures attempt to tighten its hold on society.  
The introduction of siskamling, most commonly translated as local policing 
measures, were introduced at village levels, mainly as an initiative to impose overt 
state control over local security practices by taking them out of the hands of 
organized private gangs (Barker 2001: 24). By combining traditional village 
measures with modern military measures, the regime successfully brought the 
military down to village levels and into the traditional community structure. The 
siskamling system worked by dividing local security guards into three types: satpam 
(satuan pengamanan), Kamra or Hansip (Keamanan rakyat) and ronda. The guards 
recruited by the local hamlet were coordinated by the sub-district military command 
(KORAMIL). Villages in Indonesia still feature the siskamling decorated with the 
pancasila ideological markers. The wooden hub (kentongan) used to notify the 
community has been used by neighborhood night-watches (ronda) in Java’s towns 
and villages for centuries as a device to keep thieves away, to call for territorial 
defense, and to keep people alert to ward off threats to the community (Barker 2001: 
20). The use of the siskamling system fit well with the strategies of the regime, and 
thus legitimized violence by civilians as a part of the official state security apparatus. 
It is this system of state-funded and backed vigilantism at the local level that formed 
the basis for mobilizing civilian violence groups such within the framework of the 
state. Importantly many of those who have become members of party affiliated 
                                              
5 By the 1971 election, many left their traditional alliances in Masyumi and Nadhlatul Ulama, to side with Golkar, 
reportedly as a sign of gratitude to Suharto for his role in destroying the PKI. It is worth noting that Lombok, as an island 
dominated by colonial nobles and corrupt merchants, several Muslim reformists joined the Lombok branch of the PKI after 
the murder of their leader Saleh Sungkar in 1952. as late as 1974, the military vandalized several sacred sites in efforts to 
dissuade Muslims from performing non-Islamic rituals. In Tanjung soldiers from Tanjung military command forced 
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militias such as those that will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis, were 
initially employed by the local hansip through the siskamling system. “It was mostly 
preman who were engaged in hansip, getting paid by the job, which was as much 
about creating insecurity as creating security.”6 To the regime controlling crime, was 
as much about commanding criminals and making use of them, as about maintaining 
law and order. Thus irregular forces were trained by the state security apparatus to 
regularly apply terror and violence throughout the New Order years to repress 
opposition and deal with social problems (see Collins 2002).The siskamling system 
was thereby not only about subcontracting security, but about providing a legal 
framework from which state actors, such as the police or the army could draw 
mobilziational potential for covert operations. The New Order consciously created a 
system in which controlling the criminal ensured state actors access to illegal and 
extralegal rents. The phenomenon of subcontracting violence to ‘unofficial’ units of 
the state apparatus was the way the New Order suppressed and incorporated people 
into their mold. It was not only during electiosn or to suppress strikes and 
demonstrations civilian militias were used, paramilitary units were used in 
Kalimantan during the confrontation with Malaysia in the 1960s, and were recruited 
and trained by the army to combat separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh in 
the 1990s. The groups have developed practices that include the public display of 
dismembered corpses, beheadings, rape, and threats against the families of victims of 
such violence (Robinson 2002: 226-227).  
In addition, during the 1990s violent clashes involving security forces youth 
groups such as the state sponsored Pemuda Pancasila, and youth groups tied to 
opposition parties were common all over Indonesia. Especially leaders of 
paramilitary youth organizations played the role of political enforcers under Suharto, 
operating in what one observer has called “society’s dark underbelly” (Hadiz 2003: 
127). They were frequently able to move mack and froth between respectable society 
                                                                                                                                           
villagers onto the village soccer field and made them profess their adherence to the prophet and the Koran, or they be held 
as kafirs, non-believers , which in effect meant communists. (ICG 2003).  
6 Interview Ari Dwipayana, UGM (2004) September.  
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and their underworld. In the post-Suharto, as will be discussed later, these actors have 
found new opportunities to enhance their wealth and political power.  
In the last days of the New Order, when student demonstrations threatened to 
bring down Suharto in the aftermath of the shootings at Trisakti University on May 
13, 1998, there is established a direct link between the riots and certain miltairy 
commanders. That said, despite this direct involvement, the uprising drew from a 
pool of rioters from various political streams and gangs ready to turn to the streets 
which are rooted in narrow trajectory of mobilization and nurturing of civilian 
violence groups. In as much as the modes of popular mobilization in 1998 
demonstrated a great deal of variation in orientation and mobilization patterns, they 
more strikingly echoed many of the past legacies of armed revolution, mass 
participation in and for ‘democracy’, and anti-PKI pogroms of period since 
independence. It is against this backdrop of mobilization that Indonesia followed a 
distinct trajectory during the New Order.  
 
4.4 Summing up Context  
The chapter set out to answer a set of questions rooted in an assumption that variables 
rooted in historical interpretation are essential in explaining violence in Indonesia. 
What are the historical roots of state and elite dynamics creating despotic structures, 
and secondly how has popular violence been crystallized at specific times in history?  
The historical dimension is an integral part of the structural explanations for the 
persistence of collective violence in Indonesia in the reform era. The central point and 
in this chapter has been to highlight specific constellations that are relevant for the 
current structures of elite dynamics and the use and subcontracting of violence to 
civilian perpetrators. Local elites has been viewed in relation to the state in light of 
the colonial mobilization of indigenous rules into their bureaucracies. The evolving 
of state-elite relations formed basis of the way social forces have been mobilized 
through ‘civilian militias’ as part of a broader systematic scheme.  
As has been illustrated the situations for mobilization of civilian forces for 
violence were different in the 1940s and the 1960s, mainly as a result of changing 
continuities of elite-state relations. The 65-66 massacres represented the 
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institutionalization of militias and paramilitary groups as part of the state’s control 
over the means of violence. Whereas the militias that fought the revolution had been 
dispersed and fragmented to a great variety of locally based groups, the massacres of 
leftists in 1965-66 was carried out by similar militias and paramilitary groups, locally 
organized, but in a context in which the army could command and control, and the 
new criminal boss moved towards the heart of the state.  
Predatory politics at the local level was reinforced by the strength of the 
business sector and accumulation of capital by state actors through illegal means. The 
dependency on funds flowing from the center to the local level continuously 
strengthened the financial potential for local elites. The New Order regime 
continually struggled between incorporating ‘criminal’ element and shutting them 
out, faltering a symbiosis between state and crime of which the they were highly 
dependent. This continual inter-dependency is what defines the parameters for 
political mobilization today, as will be discussed in depth in the next chapters.  
The next chapter will turn to dynamics of democratization in Indonesia and 
look at the way dominant actors constellate in the new democratic framework, 
looking at constraints and opportunities of these constellations.  
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5. DOMINANT ACTORS: ADAPTING TO OR STRANGLING 
DEMOCRACY?  
 
“…this society was bound to witness political games being played out by 
criminals, and criminal ventures carried out by politicians” (Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 
The Glass House 1992).  
 
The title to this chapter draws attention to the recurring problem in the discussion on 
democratization in the developing world; are the elites –those dominant actors- 
behaving, or are predators strangling the feeble seedlings that have taken root since 
1998? The year 2004 was the year for the first local elections and direct presidential 
elections in Indonesia as well as parallel elections for parliament. More than 16 000 
seats in the legislatures at the national, provincial, and district levels were filled. 
These were hailed by international observers as demonstrative successes and 
evidence that Indonesia was indeed on its way towards democracy (EUEOM 2004). 
The previous theoretical discussion highlighted the need to dig deeper into the 
changes in elite dynamics in relation to democracy to be able to say something about 
the current realities of violence. The evolving of state-elite relations were traced and 
formed basis of the way social forces have been mobilized through ‘civilian militias’ 
as part of a broader systematic scheme. As has been illustrated the situations for 
mobilization of civilian forces for violence were different in the 1940s and the 1960s, 
mainly as a result of changing continuities of elite-state relations. This chapter focus 
attention to the current-day dominant actors whose quest for power necessitates a 
concurrent symbiosis with a political system that in essence is meant to defer 
authoritarianism.  
As previously highlighted, arguments rooted in political economy tend to 
observe the mere continuation of a predatory kind of politics, which indeed is evident 
in both the commanding of militias and corruption, and that to uphold their powers 
they continuously work to undermine and avoid the democratic instruments that have 
been implemented. Thus, authors inspired by the likes of Robison and Hadiz (2004) 
tend to frame the discussion on democracy in the perception that the democratic 
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deficit stem from a mere bypassing of democratic instruments by predators rooted in 
the old system. The next few pages offer an account of elites and their ways of 
dealing with democracy and politics which in essence is at odds with such arguments, 
and is in stead concerned with looking at what it is that upholds the potential for 
mobilization into violence groups by observing elite behavior in the new system of 
governing. Are there no changes from the previous periods? Primarily this chapter is 
devoted to a discussion on the implications of democratic institutions on they way 
dominant actors mobilize, organize and form alliances in order to achieve or maintain 
their positions arguing that the introduction of democratic instruments has altered its 
ways, making predatory politics the dominant part of the actually existing democracy.  
After all, formal political institutions must in some ways shape the way elites 
achieve, maintain, and express their powers. Naked force has an important role too in 
the new political format. In addition, the final part of the chapter angles the thesis 
over to society, by discussing the ways predatory actors –the big men of Indonesian 
society, relate to their clients and surroundings emphasizing the importance of 
building a good image in order to preserve some sort of legitimacy.   
 
5.1 Democratic Institutions  
How do local elites organize and relate to the democratic institutions, and in light of 
the Indonesian historical trajectory, does this say something about how elites make 
use of and relate to violence groups? As previously highlighted the Demos survey 
shows, the majority of dominant actors actually battle for power via democratic 
institutions. The majority of the dominant actors pin pointed by the Demos experts 
claim that the vast majority of dominant actors ‘use’ or at least ‘use and abuse’ the 
purportedly democratic institutions (Demos 2005: 34). In addition, it is important for 
various stake holders and elites to have access to the judiciary, legislative and 
executive organs of the state through democratic means. With successful elections 
dominant actors do to a large extent adapt to the new political realities of democracy. 
the problem is, of course that those of the elite who have adapted to the new political 
paradigm, are still doing it for self aggrandizement. This is particularly true for the 
decentralized administrations at the local level. Although NGO activists and critics in 
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Indonesia said, rightfully so that “it is not a real democracy” they admitted to 
dominant actors in some way or another relate to democratic institutions7. 
 
5.1.1 Local Despotism?  
While The New Order’s despotism originated from the center, the interesting 
phenomenon here is whether the changes since 1998 have enhanced despotism at the 
local level. Pointing the arrows back to the discussion in the previous chapter on the 
genealogy of local elites, power vested in politicians at the local level has essentially 
been shaped within patrimonial hierarchies. Under the authoritarian system, the 
patronage extended from the center, via the bureaucracy and the army to the local 
level.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine the relative success of 
decentralization and the way it has been implemented apart from the impact it has had 
on the formation of new alliances between elites. That said, a few critical points that 
relate to the changing nature of elite rule in the light of the decentralization reforms 
need to be highlighted. The most important effects of decentralization reforms in 
Indonesia have been the ‘blossoming’ (pemakaran) of new provinces and districts, 
and the respective elected positions. After 1999 the number of provinces has been 
increased from 27 to 32 (Nordholt 2004: 38), and the number of districts has 
increased from roughly 340 to more than 450 (World Bank 2004), while the process 
is still in the moving. With pemakaran regents and people in other regions are 
pushing for increased autonomy and the right to self assertion through their own local 
governments. In countries with long histories of secessionist movements resolution to 
violent conflict has been implementing institutional measures to deal with the 
problem such as the devolution of authority in Spain and the UK (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 99). The special autonomy laws in Indonesia were for one meant to defer 
secessionist demands in places such as West Papua and Aceh. Another reason for 
why Habibie accelerated the decentralization process, was not only pressure from the 
international community and secessionist movements, but to uphold his own 
                                              
7 A view expressed by all NGO activists in interviews.  
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monopoly and control over state enterprise in the regions in face of final collapse. 
Golkar as an institution then supported regional autonomy as a means to maintain 
their power bases in the outer islands (Nordholt 2003: 12). Importantly, districts and 
municipalities are now autonomous units at the same time as there is no longer a 
hierarchical relationship between province and district (IRE 2002). 
The scramble for defining territory and new district borders is reflective of the 
political ambitions of local elites. In Cirebon and Madura, the defining of borders has 
been continuously delayed due to infightings and disagreement between fractions of 
elites competing for political positions and control over flows of funds from the 
center, which will be further discussed below. After all, it is a rather logical choice 
for local elites to turn against state-centrism, in the face of opportunities to enhance 
their own powers.  
In light of similar efforts in other regions, including countries in Africa where 
decentralization and regionalization reforms have been implemented, there have been 
fears that within a framework of patron-client politics, decentralization will only 
serve to strengthen despotic forms of local rule (Bayart et.al. 1999, Allen 1999, 
Mamdani 1996). The control of and use of coercive methods to achieve and/or 
maintain the control over resources is thereby integral for the local ruler. 
Furthermore, the issue of low-intensity conflicts are typical in the context of 
decentralized political authority with examples especially from West-and Central 
Africa (see Allen 1999).   
There is certainly such fears among many observers and ‘good actors’ in the 
Indonesian setting (van Klinken 2004, Sidel 2004, Nordholt 2002).8 Amongst the 
progressive urban civil society activists, there is continuous discussion whether the 
decentralization reforms are bringing about democracy at the local level.9 The fears 
of scholars have been that the various elites constellations at the local level would 
essentially monopolize power by ways of combining legal and illegal methods (ibid.).  
                                              
8 This view was also repeatedly expressed by ‘experts’ in interviews (Storo Eko IRE, Rizal UGM, Ari Dwipayana UGM)  
9 Expert interviews: Hilmar Farid (Sep.2004), Asmara Nababan (Sep. 2004), Rizal Panggabean (sep.2004).  
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In other words, it is not evident that the weakening of the central state will lead 
to more local democracy (see Nordholt 2004, Sidel 2004, van Klinken 2002, Demos 
2004). Under the conditions of entrenched patrimonialism like that ingrained in the 
provincial setting, decentralization can be accompanied by a system of local 
despotism in which violence becomes is an essential tool for the local despot in 
competition over election positions and state enterprise. The range of interests now 
contesting for power at the local level are much more varied than they were under 
Suharto. They include ambitious political entrepreneurs, aspiring business groups, 
state bureaucrats, as well as a wide range of political gangsters, thugs, and civilian 
militias (Hadiz 2003: 124). This has led many have assume that with the nature of 
local rule, function of money politics, and continuation of patron-client relations, 
decentralization would lead to the evolving of a kind of ‘local bossism’ in Indonesia. 
The trajectories of politics in both Thailand and the Philippines have displayed 
system of local bosses who rule through mafia networks, employ violence strategies 
to maintain their positions as well as working through democratic instruments such as 
local parliaments and elections. Sidel’s analysis on bossism in the Philippines suggest 
that it was the distinctive pattern of colonial era state formation which laid the 
foundation for local bossism in the Philippines. The emergence of local bosses was 
facilitated by the onset of primitive accumulation and the expanding role of the 
colonial state in the economy. After independence, the republic reconstructed the 
intuitional measures of American colonial rule with direct elections. The pattern of 
clan-based politics was transferred from the colonial auspices to the independence 
period, and so family based clans have been able to hold office and build up a 
monopolistic position in the local economy over the course of many years (Sidel 
2004: 92). Both local and national elections are dominated by these local politicians 
and local clans who have enjoyed long tenures in power as well as financial 
supremacy in their local regions10. A system of direct election in the Philippines has, 
in combination with controlling local resources, served to consolidate local fiefdoms 
among local elites. In combination with a system of stringent vote buying and 
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violence high re-election rates for incumbent legislators and local officials has meant 
a higher degree of monopolization of power (Sidel 2004: 89-94). The degree of 
volatility, high re-election rates, and a system of direct elections mean that use of 
power has been put into system in the Philippines in a way not yet seen in Indonesia. 
In Indonesia, electoral politics introduced to the local levels in 1999, meant 
transfer of power to those who managed to mobilize votes in order to get hold of 
elected offices, but a the Indonesian situation has been different. Until today, 
governors, mayors, and regents have been indirectly elected through the elected 
members of the local assemblies, the DPRD, whose legislative powers have 
broadened significantly with decentralization. This means that there are institutional 
obstacles in place that limits the opportunities of would-be elective of monopolizing 
and concentrating all power with the few.  
Finally, concentration and monopolization of power at the local level is also 
limited to a significant degree by highly institutionalized and centralized party 
system. It is an important instrument to limit ‘would-be’ bosses that all political 
parties have to be represented in at least two thirds of the provinces and two thirds of 
the regencies and cities in those provinces11. Although there are a vast range of new 
parties since 1999, these institutional limitations have served to defer the formation of 
locally based parties that can function as platform for a potential local despots. That 
said many of the NGOs, at least until recently and certain international advisors were 
proponents of introducing direct elections for the positions of mayors (walikota), 
governors (gubernur), and regents(bupati) arguing that the present system of 
proportional representation obscures the real objective of democracy, namely 
bringing power to the people. The limitation of opportunities for monopolization of 
power do also impact on the extent to which the means of violence are monopolized 
by local despots. Importantly the particular trajectory of Philippine state formation 
and long history of direct elections, represent a very different trajectory than that of 
Indonesia. In Indoensia, from colonial times it has not been possible to monopolize 
                                                                                                                                           
10 see Sidel 1999, 2004, Anderson 1988, Lacaba 1995 for further discussion on bossism in the Philippines.  
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power at the local level in a manner similar to that of the Philippines. Both during 
colonial times and during the New Order, rotation of administrators and military 
officials has hindered this kind concentration of power outside the state.  
So far so good. Elites play by the rules, and institutional obstacles hinder the 
formation of an Indonesian variety of local bossism. Politics remains predatory and 
money politics is systematized at all levels on the political ladder. It is likely that 
these institutional obstacles mean not only that monopolization of power by local 
elites is more difficult, but also that there is a fragmentation of elites and the 
formation of a vague and dispersed pattern of coalitions with various types of actors. 
The following paragraphs merit attention to the formation of oligarchies/coalitions 
established by actors in order to be able to uphold their predatory politics, arguing 
that these institutions form part of a state within which criminal networks can work 
through without compromising their adherence to the democratic game.  
 
5.1.2 State, Coalitions, and Mafia   
Predatory politics is essentially defined by the continuous scramble for personal 
aggrandizement by elites. Indonesian politics is essentially driven by the constant 
drive and machinations of politik uang (money politics) tainting the prospects for a 
justice driven, policy oriented political competition between ideologically based 
strands in society. Indonesian society is driven forward by a symbiosis between 
primitive and advanced forms of capital accumulation by ways of non-economic, 
mostly political and coercive instruments of power (Demos 2005: 35). The coercive 
instruments are privatized as opposed to state sponsored as they were under Suharto 
stemming from the collaboration between the politics and crime, which dates back to 
the colonial period and before.  
Interestingly, many of the actors do not necessarily view gaining ascendancy 
at the sub-provincial level of politics as a natural step towards provincial or national 
politics because they are increasingly finding theat regional autonomy provides 
                                                                                                                                           
11 Furthermore new parties have to have at least one thousand members or one thousandth of the population in each 
regency/city in addition to meet the requirements of registration with Ministry of Justice (ICG 2004)  
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lucrative opportunities for rent-seeking activities at the sub-provincial level itself. 
Despite this, what is crucial with regard to the changing continuities of local elite 
relations is that, despite the fact that regions have autonomy with regards to a number 
of arrangements, the central government still controls the main sources of revenue of 
the regions. As Nordholt has contended “what we are actually witnessing in 
Indonesia is a decentralization of administrative power that is heavily subsidized by 
the central government” (2003:12). About 80 percent of the income tax, import and 
export duties, value added tax, in addition to the majority of government enterprises 
and foreign aid, is still controlled by the central government. At the same time, 
provincial rulers such as governors, city mayors, and regents have come to enjoy 
broader powers to enact legislation on matters such as new taxes and regulations 
under the laws on decentralization in 1999 (ibid.). It is not surprising though that 
many of the elected bupatis and walikotas have themselves been levying taxes and 
charges on business and the public. In North Sumatra for example local politicians 
have been looking to introduce levies in the anticipation of reduced transfers from the 
center. In this area local politicians scramble to get control over revenue from the 
plantation sector and to obtain the right to introduce new levies (Hadiz 2003: 123-
124). This is however, an issue for constant struggle, and in the mean time they are 
meddling with money trying to bend the rules once in office12.   
The business class in Indonesia has remained foreign to politics and has thus 
been unable to assert national leadership as an independent political actor. Compared 
to other countries in the region where businessmen dominate electoral politics and 
have been a prominent independent force (Sidel 2003: 10-11), the Indonesian 
business class has proven much less assertive. This provides an ample example for 
the limitations of the middle class in exposing democratic attributes, as the business 
class, as a whole has never attained a progressive attitude towards regime transition in 
Indonesia. This reveals peculiar and interesting patterns concerning the way the 
financial and politico-bureaucratic elite have built their coalitions in the post-Suharto 
years. There are two types of business-political coalitions that are integral to the 
                                              
12 This point was also stated by Sutoro (IRE) and Rizal Panggabean in interviews.  
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precarious dynamics of elite-politics in Indonesia. Firstly there are the businessmen 
outside the system who couple up with, and play a supporting role of those members 
of the politico-bureaucratic elite who are themselves occupying state office (through 
their elected or appointed positions). Secondly, there are the businessmen who are 
themselves career bureaucrats or politicians, and who get their business interests 
directly from the state. The Indonesian business class does thereby not represent a 
coherent independent political force vis-à-vis the state, but is –by and large due to its 
diverse and factionalized nature- heavily ingrained into the state apparatus. “You 
cannot be a politician without having access to money. And you cannot have access 
to money without at least being friends with a politician.”13 What is important with 
regards to the way elites mobilize and build alliances, is furthermore highly 
dependent on the way individual businessman have emerged as prominent members 
and backers of political parties at the national level, and among powerful coalitions 
and mafia-networks in regional and district level politics (ibid.: 25). In order to 
enhance one’s own business interests it is necessary to enter the political arena, either 
as a politician or through establishing contacts with a politician. Therefore, financial 
barons are increasingly getting attached to the instruments of a broadened democratic 
political system through the building of coalitions with parties and local parliaments 
to get control over, or at least access to, the levers of state regulation and patronage at 
the local level. An intresting point made by one observer of political changes in North 
Sumatra which demonstrates the growing attractiveness for local business in wielding 
control over the state apparatus is that six successful candidates for bupati and 
walikota in the 2003 elections had backgrounds as local entrepreneurs such as 
contractors (Hadiz 2003: 126).  
It is an interesting and important point concerning changes in Indonesia since 
1999 that, according to Demos (2005: 35), alliances with state actors, such as 
politicians, political parties, legislative bodies, and officials within public 
                                              
13 Rizal Panggabean expert UGM (Sept 2004), All politicians interviewed (PDI-P, Golkar, and PPP) answered that they, 
and their companions depend on their close connections to business. They also emphasized that there were many who were 
primarily businessmen got involved in politics as a means to enhance their powers.  
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administration are as important as forming alliances with business people. This means 
that dominant actors are increasingly relying on elected positions to get their way. 
Thus, despite privatization and deregulation during the years of IMF influence, the 
realm of state ownership, state regulation, and state intervention in the Indonesian 
economy remains enormous.    
Access to the state through parliaments is needed order to gain control over 
resources, contracts, and spoils. The size of the state, and its over-arching role in 
controlling capital, has led to dominant actors primarily use political combined with 
economic means to get control over these resources. The increased competition 
between rent-seeking individuals resulting from the introduction of elections has lead 
to an expansion of investments paid just to get into elected positions. The type of 
corruption deriving from this kind of short term rent seeking is of a more sinister kind 
and greedy type of corruption evolving from this kind of short term rent-seeking than 
the one deriving from more long term rent-seeking, defines local level politics in 
Indonesia today. In this way the interaction between the practice of power, economic 
accumulation, and illicit activities takes place in relation to the state through the use 
of democratization instruments of power.  
This dependency on the central state by local elites, reflect to certain extents 
neo-patrimonial tendencies. Historically the local elites have based themselves on 
external resources because their own local societies are relatively impoverished. The 
institutional measures of concentrating wealth in the central state, while 
decentralizing administrative authority creates a peculiar dynamics of sorts dragging 
on increased competition at the local level, but depending on forging alliances with 
central level actors as well. Importantly, the circulation of bureaucrats that was so 
characteristic of New Order centralized control, never halted in face of 
decentralization (see Sidel 2003, 2004; Nordholt 2004).  
The following example illustrates well the characteristics of center-local 
dependency after decentralization reforms. The implementation of democratic reform 
has opened space for new and active actors to play the field in Jakarta. Where 
Suharto had previously been the boss in a centralized criminal state, there has been an 
expansion in political assets over which variants of elites can compete. In examining 
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the development at the local level, the link from the center to their local regions is 
increasingly becoming a tool to mobilize patronage.  
The circulation of elites during the Suharto years served to hinder the 
development of alliances based on ethnic affiliations. In a longer perspective the 
elites in traditional guise such as the Yogyakarta sultanate serve, as they did under 
Suharto, legitimacy for their daerah-identity. Today, with certain limitations, the 
combination of local control with continued dependency on the center has meant that 
many elites return from Jakarta to their area of origin in the hope that at least they can 
do “something of what they used to do there.”14 The excess of new players at the 
center has meant that coalition building is becoming increasingly more decentralized 
than it was under Suharto.  
For example in the election to of a new governor for South Sumatra in August 
2003, Syahrial Oesman, was launched as a putra daerah candidate to challenge the 
incumbent Rosihan Arsyad, a former naval officer. Rosihan was the official candidate 
for the PDI-P. The party held 26 out of 75 seats, but had formed an alliance with 
Golkar for 15 seats which in essence gave Rosihan 41 votes. Oesman was nominated 
in part because of his ethnic identity, his strong ties to Golkar, his chairmanship to the 
Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Purniwaran ABRI (FKPPA- Communication forum 
for the children of retired military officers) in Bangka, and that he was supported by 
the military faction. More importantly, however, was it that Oesman was a close 
associate of Taufiq Kiemas Megawati’s husband and central player in the so-called 
Palembang mafia, Kiemas own network in South Sumatra. In addition, several local 
businessmen supported his campaign (Collins and Sirozi 2004). Initially Oesman won 
the election with one vote, but the result was contested after several irregularities 
were revealed. In response, Oesman and his supporters mobilized more than 5000 
supporters, many whom were brought in busses from Oesman’s and Kiemas’ home 
region to give their support. In a familiar pattern the demonstrators consisted also of 
Pemuda Pancasila thugs and other local preman groups who been paid to attend to 
demonstrate their strength (TempoInteraktif 2003). Furthermore, after the scramble 
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which to which it is rumored that Rosihan was given the choice to choose between 
the gun or leaving his position15 the position of PDI-P branch leader in South 
Sumatra vacant, until Kiemas’ younger brother Nazruddin Kiemas was elected the 
new leader. The Palembang group/mafia depended highly on getting one of its own 
into office in order to get hold of valuable building –and logging contracts. There is 
no contradiction between the being heavily ingrained with the sate enterprise and 
being key-players in powerful cliques and mafia in kabubaten and kotamadaya-level 
politics. Evidently power brokerage in the post-Suharto period has become much 
more elusive at the local level, due to the strengthened authority of local parliaments 
in combination with the continued strength of Jakarta.  
One such part taker has not been discussed yet which is the military elite 
whose tradition for business enterprise and political involvement has already been 
mentioned. When it comes to the coalitions between military-politico-business 
coalitions there are important changes with regards to the fusion of political domains 
as well. Nevertheless, sections of the military (TNI) still remain a major force in 
politics, notwithstanding often-instated intensions to revamp its dual function. The 
symbiotic relationship between the TNI and the state may have become less official 
than it was during the New Order; however, it remains one of the most particular 
features of elite dynamics in Indonesia. Placing the military under civilian control and 
split the functions of the police and the armed forces has been one of the central 
reforms in the democratization process. Most NGOs are concerned with the 
continued role of the military in politics, however they also emphasize that their role 
has changed from acting as an institutions in itself, to the upholding their dominance 
over financial gains at the local level16. After all, the political interests of the TNI 
have never been vested in the legislative as such. Its impact derived from its ability to 
impact on the development and implementation of policies (Kingsbury 2004).  
                                                                                                                                           
14 Hilmar Farid (2004), Interview, Jakarta.  
15 Rizal Panggabean, UGM (2004) Interview.  
16Interviews (2004) in Jakarta with Teresa Birks (ICTJ), October, Sutoro Eko (IRE), September, Mufti Makaram (KontraS), 
September  
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Nevertheless, there are signs that the old pacts of dominance by the military 
elite are fracturing. Within a new situation they are forced to forge alliances with 
political parties and parliaments that compete to assert control over crucial state 
resources, and their dominance (notably outside conflict zones such as West Papua 
and Aceh), are thus not deriving primarily from their military positions, but from 
their relative ability to get involved in business (ibid.). This implies that the military 
is also playing a heavy hand in predatory money politics at the local level, which in 
essence is nothing new, but that should be interpreted in relation to a political reality 
in which the local elite is becoming increasingly fragmented in face of heightened 
competition over elected positions. What it means is that in order to uphold their 
control over state resources and private businesses, they rely on building their 
coalitions and networks, on upholding mafia enterprises, while competing for elected 
positions, or in any case on funding politicians in order to propel their own kind into 
parliaments. The support  of civilian militias such as Laskar Jihad (a religiously 
based militia who have been heavily involved in the conflict in Maluku) the Pemuda 
Pancasila, and  the KPPA, who willingly lend their muscles for party rallies, 
demonstrations, and intimidation of political opponents. As will be discussed in depth 
in the next chapter, civilian militias such as the Pemuda Pancasila and FKPPA 
amongst others play an increasingly prominent  role as parts of these coalitions and 
networks, mutually dependent on each other.17  
This system is different from that under Suharto in two defined and particular, 
but diverging ways: The opened political space deriving from implementation of 
democratic rights such as freedom of organization and freedom of speech have meant 
increased competition from other groups/cliques/oligarchs/political parties and social 
forces in society over the spoils of state membership. Secondly, the demise of the 
unipolar system of political domination by military/Golkar proficiencies has opened 
space for a new diverging pattern of domination in a multipolar system of power. The 
old pacts of dominance have fractured in the business in general can no longer just 
                                              
17 Conclusions drawn on interviews and conversations with experts (Mufti Makarim, KontraS, Sandyawan, Tim relawan 
Kemanusiaan) and actors: Pemuda Pancasila members interview, Jakarta October.  
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get access to state patronage through the politico-bureaucratic power within the 
predatory departments of the state, to provide protection and monopoly, but rather 
access to and control over the instruments of democracy such as political parties and 
local and national parliaments. 
 
5.2 The Predators   
Another issue that has not been discussed this far is the way dominant actors deal 
with society. As was stated in the first part of this thesis, in order to fully grasp  the 
dynamics of violence and those predatory dynamics that makes controlling the means 
of violence necessary, there is a demand to include ‘society’ as part of the discussion. 
After all dominant actors in Indonesia do not only meddle with institutions, they 
depend highly on their clients not only to mobilize votes, but also to mobilize 
genuine support. The potential for mobilization within the spheres of political 
conduct are also dependent on certain symbolic attributes for power. Politics in 
Indonesia is about “big men” –orang besar- who depend on building up networks 
and entourages to ensure and enhance their reach into society.18 Controlling and 
mobilizing clientelistic networks is integral for this kind of mediating. Orang besar –
are respected (at times feared) not only as a result of their wealth, position, or even 
criminal influence but also from their expression of ‘prowess’. The potential for 
mobilizing and attaining clients is rooted in historical as well as more modern 
affinities. The varying degrees to which actors become dominant, or assert the special 
aura of prowess is dependent on a variety of associations. The role and position of the 
thief in the colonial Javanese village has already been discussed. Lower ranking 
leaders in politically affiliated militias (mostly preman) as well as among Golkar 
leaders display the tattoo as an emblem of prowess.19 The display of gold by the 
                                              
18 Pak Ari Dwipayana UGM, has carried out several in depth studies on the symbolic powers and attributes of various 
dominant actors in Indonesia, especially Yogyakarta. Interview (2004) September. Furthermore, the term orang besar is 
used by ordinary Indonesians to characterize dominant actors (own observation). The wording has long historical 
connotations (see Wolters 1982).  
19 Ari (ibid.). The tattoo bears a special symbolic attribute in Indonesian society, stemming from the Petrus killings of the 
1980s in which the tattoo was read as the ‘label’ of the criminal, the symbol displayed by preman. See Barker (1998) fro an 
in depth discussion of the symbolic attributes of the tattoo and the tattoo as a defining label for individuals and groups in 
Indonesian society.  
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Golkar leaders at their office in Yogyakarta appropriate certain characteristics of their 
masculine domination towards their surroundings.20  
With the unraveling of the New Order, the characters who have their roots in 
the New Order gangster circles, have found new opportunities to enhance their wealth 
and social status. Oloan Panggabean, a Sumatran goon, is a typical example of an 
‘orang besar’ first starting his career as commander of the paramilitary youth group 
IPK (Ikatan Pemuda Karya), and offshoot of the Pemuda pancasila. Many locals 
refer to him as the real ‘night time mayor’ of Medan (Hadiz 2003: 128) while it is 
common knowledge that he controls the smuggling -and gambling business stretching 
form Riao to Singapore, with strong international links21. Under the auspices of Olo, 
as he is famously known, the IPK soon became the most powerful militia in Medan 
(ibid.) playing out street fights with competing groups and playing the security card.  
Olo has built up a popular image of himself through clever use of media, good 
alliances and charity involvement. It is a point to note that while civilian militias 
(youth groups) fight it out in the street Olo and his ‘enemies’ remain cordial friends 
in the political arena. Moreover his social standing is improved by charitable work. 
During the unrest in Aceh in 2001, refugees flocked from Aceh to Medan. When it 
was safe for them to return they needed transport. The local police commander called 
Olo to fix it, and so the next day busses were packed and ready to bring the refugees 
back to Aceh. As a proper God Father he has mobilized vast efforts, money and 
personnel for the reconstruction work in Ache after the Tsunami hit on December 26th 
2004. The individual ‘prowess’ is this demonstrated through taking community 
responsibility as well as ability and willingness to solve problems that otherwise 
would have demanded a lot of bureaucracy through political channels. In spite of his 
role in crime (and violence) he is a local hero. Olo’s wealth derives from illegal 
business; however the legitimate actions he has taken in the local community plays a 
greater role in legitimizing his right to power and social position. “People do not see 
the real links between the street violence and Olo, they only see what he gives back to 
                                              
20 Own observations during interviews with Golkar leaders, Yogyakarta, October 2004.  
21 Ari (ibid) and Rizal Panggabean UGM interview, September 
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the people. You cannot see smuggling, and so it is not a problem.”22 Most accumulate 
merit as did Olo by contributing freely both to their communities and to individuals 
in need of loans or employment. In this way, they act as patrons maintaining their 
popularity, while often getting in return success at the polls, and insuring a legitimate 
position in society.  
The protection rackets around these “orang besar” provide the necessary aura 
of ‘prowess’ for the ‘orang besar’. There is hardly a politician or businessman who 
does not keep a tale of security guards or thugs in his vicinity.  As one scholar of 
‘mafia’ has noted: “a reputation for credible protection and protection itself tend to be 
one and the same thing. The more robust the reputation…, the less the need to have 
recourse to the resources which support that reputation” (Gambetta cited in Sidel 
1999b: 89). As has been discussed, under the New Order it was common knowledge 
that the power of the youth organizations (civilian militias) was rooted in their 
associates with local military commands. Today, this power is more dispersed, and 
controlling thugs is a necessity for most political actors. That said, clearly the 
mafiosos of the New Order are well placed to threaten and deploy violence as an 
important means to secure control local state apparatus. With the changing role of the 
military, militias and thugs are especially needed. This will be further discussed in the 
next chapter.  
Money politics are not only features of North Sumatran local politics. In 
Yogyakarta, the local elites emphasize their ‘high cultural position’.  For the Sultan 
of Yogyakarta the cultural attributes makes up the formal power basis, while their 
political affiliations are what allows him and his family to actually perform politics. 
Whereas those with power in colonial society were blessed with ‘traditional’ or 
‘cultural’ attributes of political prowess that enabled them to enrich themselves 
through the colonial bureaucracy, other sources of power is demanded. The Sultan of 
Yogyakarta has strengthened his position by entering into politics, representing the 
Golkar party machine. His wife and son are also Golkar representatives in the DPRD. 
In addition, they control vast economic enterprise in Yogyakarta such as Malioboro 
                                              
22 Interview student and activist from Medan (2004).  
  
63
Mall and Hotel Garuda in the city center. In addition controlling industries placed on 
the Sultan’s land is also an asset for empowering the Sultan through his machinations 
of political goods. Despite the display of these traits, also the traditionally rooted 
elites of Yogyakarta depend on mobilizing violence at particular times of crisis. 
Through his Golkar patronage the Sultan has access to privatized means of violence. 
During the run-up to the elections for bupati in Sleman in 2003, bomb threats and 
accusations of bribery, intimidation, and kidnapping colored the campaign.23  
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks  
It is important to recognize that naked force has an important role in the new political 
format too. There is a peculiar combination of dominant actors adapting to 
democracy, while at the same time strangling the seedlings by squeezing the juice out 
of potential peaceful meddling.   
While political economists have focused on a rather simplistic picture of the 
political realities in the post-Suharto period, the previous pages have directed 
attention to how democratic reform and the introduction of democratic instruments 
have shaped and partly altered the way dominant actors relate to the state. This 
chapter has discussed the implications of decentralization reforms and the 
introduction of democratic instruments such as elections and the ways dominant 
actors form networks and coalitions in the post-Suharto era. First, because dominant 
actors have hijacked and monopolized democratic institutions as a means to get 
access to the state, one cannot only see the mere carrying out of peaceful local 
elections as a sign of successful democratization. There have been fears amongst 
observers that the implementation of local elections for the positions of bupati, 
gubernur, and walikota would lead to local elites being able to monopolize and 
concentrate power at the local level. In light of the historical discussion, the 
Indonesian trajectory has produced different results. At the local level control over 
elected positions has become the most attractive way to access state resources. 
Introduction of competitive elections has meant a broadening of the political arena 
                                              
23 Ari Dwipayana, UGM, (2004) Interview. September.  
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and an increase in competitors. The newly salient political actors have tended to be 
small and medium-level entrepreneurs who are dependent on state projects and 
contracts to uphold their powers, professional politicians who are part of local and/or 
national networks (mafia) with links to the New Order parties, or activists from 
various social organizations. One common trait is the necessity to have close 
connections with business. Such excessive competition requires enormous 
investments which in essence lead to short-term rent-seeking. In turn, controlling 
means of violence is a way for dominant actors, not to bypass democratic institutions 
or strike deals outside the legitimate institutions, but to flex muscle and build up an 
entourage as big men of politics as part dependency on controlling cash and/or 
intimidate opponents. As opposed to previous periods and a bossism situation, the 
elite is much more fragmented and the coalitions much more elusive than under 
previous regimes which is reflected very much in the ways violence is mobilized and 
used, a point which will be discussed thoroughly in the following chapter. The final 
part of the chapter highlighted how dominant actors who use violence also adhere to 
the democratic game.   
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6. VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY   
 
The juxtaposition of these two words of seemingly opposite meanings highlights the 
curious dynamics of which political parties and dominant social groups relate to 
politics. While the last chapter concentrated on the peculiar dynamics of dominant 
actors and democratic politics, this chapter merit attention to the social forces that 
mobilize, organize, and criminalize politics in Indonesia. One of the particularities of 
the Indonesian trajectory already discussed is the historical symbiosis between crime 
and politics.  
This chapter seeks to illuminate the peculiar manifestation and dynamic of 
“civilian militias” that emerged against the backdrop of a particular regime transition 
from authoritarian rule in Indonesia. Paramilitary units are first and foremost 
proponents and vehicles for predatory politics played out by elites. The much-
lamented persistence of violence over the past seven years can largely be explained as 
a product of structural forces and dynamics beyond the control of “good” actors, but 
should also be seen from dual perspective with focus on the specific formation of 
civilian militias, the organizational unit that carries out much of the violence. The 
chapter will first elaborate on the structural varieties of politically affiliated militias, 
their tasks, operatives, and most importantly the link with various types of dominant 
actors.  
In view of the previous theoretical discussion, the following questions merit 
especially careful considerations: When do politicians make use of militias and what 
are their tasks? What other informal practices have characterized the treatment of 
this phenomenon by government officials and/or state security personnel? When do 
political parties express affiliation to militias, and when do activities remain covert? 
First, the chapter elaborates on the various types of extralegal violence that occur 
against the backdrop of transition. Secondly, it deals with the symbiosis between 
crime and politics, and finally the problems of legitimizing links to militias. That is, 
while the groups examined here have organizational roots in the New Order their 
significance lay precisely in their ability to institutionalize their capacities as part of 
politics in the democratic era. 
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6.1 Extralegal Violence 
To explore the questions raised about violence by civilian militias in relation to 
political reform and democratization, the various forms need to be related to the 
continuum of Indonesian extralegal violence. Such violence can range from 
spontaneous and informal, such as mob lynching to systematic murders by justice-
seeking individuals, to more organized forms of violence linked to powerful 
individuals in the community, such as local strongmen of various forms. The 
continuum of this sort is based on the degree of spontaneity, organization, and elite-
involvement in security efforts and the nature of specific constellations.   
In Indonesia, the most spontaneous of several forms of extralegal violence is 
the crowd lynching, involving civilians in the community or village, and taking 
justice into their own hands under the sway of an immediate crowd reaction to a 
suspected thief or lawbreaker. Usually the lynching erupts suddenly at the instigation 
by an appointed scout or informal leader, and often involves brutal violence such as 
hacking the victim to death or severe beatings. This type of violence is nothing new 
to Indonesia.  
Less spontaneous than the relatively anonymous mob-lynchings that have 
taken place which is more closely linked to power-brokers in the community are the 
ninjas that have been particularly connected to the killings of sorcerers in East Java 
since 1998 (Cribb 2000: 191-202) and security operations in Lombok (ICG). The 
ninjas, named after Japanese cartoon figures dressed in black operated in groups 
targeting specific perceived criminals and alleged sorcerers, and in a peak-period in 
1998-1999 even Islamic scholars in East Java (see Cribb 2000, Herriman 2004). 
These ninjas stand in sharp contrast to the spontaneous village mobs, as they operate 
underground dressed up as mystical figures, often targeting their victims at home at 
night. The sense of fear and dread inflicted upon the community in connection to 
these specific incidents are very much reminiscent of the way the New Order state 
sought to inspire paralyzing terror among their enemies and victims.  
Since 1998, attention has been directed towards more organized forms of 
vigilante efforts in certain areas of Indonesia. The insecurity sense by many 
Indonesians after the fall of the New Order regime was deeply rooted in the common 
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perception that, after all, the military, with its local command and organizational 
structures had upheld a level of general security and predictability. The demand for 
protection and personal security surged in response to the perceived rise in crime and 
violence (Colombijn 2002). In a political climate of uncertainty and an economic 
climate of crisis, communities took to organize their own vigilante movements, based 
on the same structures as had evolved with the siskamling- system under Suharto, but 
(mostly) without the local military command. 
The term pam swakarsa refers to the so-called voluntary security guards that 
have surged during the past seven years. Many of the pam swakarsa have developed 
into civilian militias with their own uniforms and organizational structures and have 
been known to use extremely brutal violence in their dealings with alleged criminals. 
While the authorities encouraged the formation of such civilian guards in the 1980s, 
the term gained notoriety when the pam swakarsa were called in to safeguard the 
special session of the DPR in Jakarta in 1998 (see Dijk 2001, Ryter 2002, Telle 2004, 
ICG 2003). Within this discourse, the boundary for what is criminal and what is not is 
randomly moved and stretched depending on circumstance, environment, 
expectations, and importantly personnel.  
They share these attributes with the party security groups, satgas parpol which 
are paramilitary wings of the political parties. The pam swakarsa are with shifting 
degrees often closely attached to stately authorities. The difference between the types 
of vigilantism and political militias, with which this thesis is concerned, lies in the 
fact that latter is directly connected to some sort of political or ideological grouping 
such as a political party or a social/religious organization. Vigilantism on the other 
hand comes primarily as the initiative of private civil interests and therefore usually 
involves a greater degree of spontaneity and smaller organizational space. This is not 
to imply that vigilante groups are completely spontaneous, because many are highly 
organized, and usually involve the active participation of at least local elites, and they 
may even enjoy the support of the national government.  
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Whereas satgas are an official part of the party structures, the politically 
affiliated civilian militias are organized outside the party structures, albeit receiving 
funding from the party itself.24 They have some sort of ideological, religious, or 
populist expression beyond fighting crime and providing security. In general, they are 
concerned with issues that are wider than purely local ones, and do operate on a 
larger geographical scale, often with more coordination and planning than do local 
vigilante initiatives. That said, in reality there is considerable overlap between the 
two categories of pam swakarsa and satgas/politically affiliated civilian militias, 
especially in urban areas. It is also common for political militias and similar 
organizations to involve in combating crime and try to impose some sort of moral 
code on society. In the same manner vigilantism more often than not involve elite 
influence, participation, or even instigation.25  
One element enhancing the independence of the civilian militias is the fact that 
most of them have arisen out of a peculiar symbiosis between state and non-state 
interests. Some groups have evolved within state agencies like Suharto’s state party 
Golkar or ABRI and worked in some form of cooperation with state forces to stamp 
out opposition forces. That said most of the militias dominant today have developed 
outside the state, but in relation to various social and political forces competing for 
power and access to state resources such as elected positions. The relative influence 
of these non-state actors may arise in the light of the inability of the state to prevent 
powerful social groups from enhancing their position through the means of violence; 
even though state actors often also welcome this kind of “help” in certain matters. A 
common feature of all the organizations are that they employ mass mobilization, 
demonstrations, and other forms of pressure while also serving as kinds of multi-
purpose units providing security –or insecurity- for leaders and enemies living off the 
stems of illegal activities such as gambling, prostitution, money collection etc. 
(Asgart 2004: 643-669).  
                                              
24 Gather from interviews with satgas PDI-P and PPP, and Brigass. Confirmed by Sofian Asgart, interview September.  
25 for similar cases and discussion on vigilantism as a phenomenon see Abrahams 1998, Rosenbaum 1976, Harnischfeger 2003, 
Akinyele 2001. 
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According to one estimate there are around thirty such organized militias with 
an estimated membership of 700 000 people, the majority of whom belong to the 
modernist Islamic side (Nordholt 2002: 51), although one can speculate whether the 
number is much higher. There are two forms of militias that are becoming more 
prominent in the post-Suharto era. The first are the various groups attached to 
political movements, whose degree of ideological cohesiveness is often exaggerated 
and who recruit young people from various social backgrounds, but most often, they 
are from the underclass or less privileged groups (Ryter 2002, King 1999). The 
second emerging from social organization is prophetic neo-fundamentalist Islamic 
movements which are means of social advancement or at any rate of economic 
survival for their leaders and which offer them access to public space and even a 
range of international contacts.26 The members of these religiously based 
organizations refer to themselves as laskar (King 1999: 30-40). It goes without 
saying that these organizations are well placed to participate in activities considered 
criminal by law while they are self-enunciating ideological grounds for promoting 
their activities as legitimate. Thus the primary means of mobilizing collective and 
individual strategies is through vague nationalist ideologies (mostly the pancasila), 
various interpretations of religion (Islam), ethnicity (in local conflicts), and a vague 
adherence to party ideologies such as demokrasi and reformasi. The latter is typical 
for PDI-P affiliated militias.27 To the extent that the mobilizational efforts are 
shallow, case oriented, or dispersive in terms of political goals for reform, they do 
nevertheless represent streams of interests of historical affinities. 28  
                                              
26 Interviews and conversations with three GPK members (September), one ex-Laskar Jihad member, and one FPI-member who all 
said they received funding from Saudi missionaries. That particular information was not confirmed, but is likely as it is common 
with Saudi Arabian support for funding mosques and pesantren.  
27 Based on interviews/conversations with five satgas PDI-P, two Brigass members, and interview with expert Sofian Asgart 
(2004) who has studied civilian militias in depth; see also Sofian 2003.  
28At It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the trends of militia organization in conflict areas as militias also here form as 
parts of larger combating forces in the local conflict, consisting mostly of young men who gather quickly to defend their 
community against external threats to their village or town (interview Hilmar Farid 2004). Elites on either side of the conflict have 
direct control over such means of violence through its ability to mobilize and arm such local efforts. In communal conflicts, the 
militias are mobilized mostly along the lines of their ethnic, religious, or regional affiliations (Nordholt 2002: 33-61) rather than 
the more fragmented nature of politically affiliated militias in Java as discussed. Direct state involvement in such militia initiatives 
vary greatly from area to area. In East Timor in 1999, the militias that were formed and armed by the military were sent there to 
“secure the area” while in Maluku it is more common that local police from either side of the conflict, allocate access to the means 
of violence to these local groups (interviews Hilmar Farid 2004, Sandyawan 2004).  
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For the purpose of analytical clarity, this thesis deal only with the categories of 
the paramilitary groups that are in some ways attached to political parties, although 
the analytical categories and many of the conclusions apply to the more organized 
forms of pam swakarsa as well. These can be categorized crudely as follows although 
both the members themselves and ordinary Indonesians tend to switch. 
Although paramilitary mobilization trace a long lineage in Indonesian history, 
the re-emergence of a vast number of civilian militias signals an especially sinister 
turn with the implementation of multi-party democracy. Leaving aside for the 
moment the contested relations between the militias and dominant actors, the 
following few paragraphs focus attention on the significance of militias in the post-
Suharto period. While the symbolic power of such real potential for violence 
demands scrutiny, the pages below seek to recover the traces of a peculiar 
manifestation of violence-groups forming in the shadow of legitimate political and 
social organizations. Inasmuch the very existence of paramilitary units seems to defy 
the principles of democratization, they have paradoxically evolved as part of a broad, 
albeit, fragmented organizational landscape, attached to parties, organizations, and 
individual dominant actors. It is with safe saying that the greatest threat of violence 
arises from the existence of these paramilitary groups linked to the military, political 
parties, and Islamic organizations. 
 
6.1.1 The Cases of GPK and Brigass 
Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah (GPK, Kabah youth movement) was founded in Jakarta in 
1982 as the youth wing to the Muslim party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 
and formed an additional youth wing to the official PPP satgas, called Angkatan 
Muda Ka’bah (AMKA). The perceived need for self-defense groups for political 
parties stem from the violent street fights between party affiliates from the staged 
elections in 1997 and 1982. In both elections Golkar affiliated youths and thugs were 
mobilized by Ali Moertopo on Suharto’s behalf (King 1999: 30), to attack and 
intimidate groups associated with other parties. The generic formula for election 
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staged violence was indeed the very reason for why various youth groups were 
allowed to exist (ibid.). Following the asas tunggal law of 1984,29 the PPP was 
forced to adapt the generic label of satgas also for the laskar units. GPK’s activities 
remained rather insignificant until its branch was founded in Yogyakarta in 1999 as a 
“spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm from PPP youth in the area” according to 
themselves (Sofian 2004: 657). That said, its real mobilization potential was as much 
rooted in a demand from central actors in the Yogyakarta party branches of the PPP 
and PDI-P to flex muscles ahead of the 1999 election (King 1999). Resuming the 
label laskar for their members, the GPK drew support both from poor pesantren 
(Islamic boarding schools) in Central Java, and from amongst unemployed youth in 
Yogyakarta.30 Since 1999 then, GPK has developed into a loosely knit mobilizational 
unit in its own right, officially outside the party structures of the PPP and therefore 
ensured a level of leverage and independence from official, legitimate party politics.31 
According to one of its central leaders the GPK core activities was initially to 
promote Islam through the “holy actions of Muslims and the religion of Islam, and to 
promote Islamic values and livelihood in the name of democracy,” while it officially 
also had to work to support the political goals of the PPP. 32  As a civilian militia 
GPK has gotten most attention for its ‘purity campaigns’ against night clubs, 
gambling halls, prostitutes, and homosexuals in Yogyakarta. Those associated with 
GPK claim that they have moved away from the official party-line because they felt 
the corrupt politicians were only after money and fame, and do not care about the real 
principles of Islam and democracy.33 The PPP do on their hand claim that they have 
pressured GPK out of their official structure because they have become too 
independent and do not agree that the principles of Islam can be implemented with 
the use of violence.34 
                                              
29 sole foundation law  which stipulated that all parties adopt the pancasila as their ideological foundation. Religious symbols were 
forbidden as a marker of political affiliation 
30 Sofian Asgart interview, 2004.  
31 Interviews with AMKA commander (2004), and two GPK activists, Yogyakarta, September.  
32 Interview GPK commander, Yogyakarta (2004), September.  
33 Ibid;  
34 Views expressed by PPP local leader, interview (2004) September.  
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Even more significant is it that GPK function as protection rackets and 
neighborhood watchdogs downtown Yogyakarta, in addition to being heavily 
involved in underworld activities such as gambling and prostitution.35 In similar veins 
as those youth organizations mobilized during the New Order, the GPK claimed the 
‘right to secure’ the area near Taman Sari after carrying a series of night-time raids 
intimidating shop owners and inhabitants in the kampung;  “they drove through my 
kampung on motorcycles, throwing Molotov Cocktails into shops. They beat the ones 
who tried to stop them. Now we pay them to leave us alone.”36  
In the specific case of PPP and GPK in Yogyakarta, a direct link can be 
established between the actions of GPK, the police, and central politicians. The event 
is nothing particular about Yogyakarta, but typical when it comes to the involvement 
and the role of political parties in violence, and a link to the state via the security 
apparatus. One of the karaoke bars of a well-known Chinese businessman in 
Yogyakarta was destroyed by so-called “purity-groups’ –GPK affiliated thugs who 
demanded the owner to stop selling alcohol. They emptied bottles, broke windows, 
and destroyed the furniture in the bar. The thugs were wearing masks, but did 
according to the bare owner smell heavily of alcohol themselves. Interestingly, later 
that evening the PPP deputy chair to the legislature called saying to the businessman 
that he would need their help. He offered him his own security forces to protect all 
his businesses. The bar-owner politely refused the offer, claiming protection from the 
police. Later the owner was contacted by the Yogyakarta head of police who advised 
him to accept the politician’s offer of protection against thugs as they would be 
unable to provide sufficient protection against the “extreme actions of preman”37.  
A similar type of organization can be traced with regards to the PDI-P 
affiliated organization of Brigass 38 who has its stronghold in Bogor and Jakarta. 
                                              
35 Sofian Asgart interview 2004, Rizal Panggabean interview (2004), September  
36 Interview with local shop owner and his son (anonymous), Yogyakarta, October. Such events are common also in other 
major cities in Indonesia; especially the by likes of  Pemuda Pancasila and Ikatan Pemuda Karya, New Order originated 
youth groups, who have recurred onto the stage. Reportedly the two organizations have divided Medan between them 
(Rizal Panggabean interview).  
37 Rizal Panggabean, interview (2004), September.  
38 the long name of Brigass demonstrate its sole political foundation: Barisan rakyat Indonesia Penjaga Demokrasi siap 
antar Mega menjadi RI satu- Indonesian guardiand of democracy, ready to struggle for Mega’s presidency.  
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Brigass was established with the only political aim to bring Megawati to presidency 
after her losing out to Abduraham Wahid in the 1999 elections. The founding 
members expressed that they felt the elections had been useless and a sham as ‘the 
people’s will did not secure her victory’ (Sofian 2003: 649). With Megawati taking 
over the presidency after the legal and constitutionally bound impeachment of Wahid 
in 2001, Brigass lost its ideological momentum. It has however, continued to be a 
highly relevant part of the public landscape, becoming increasingly better organized 
and coordinated (ibid.).  
However, the ideological mission expressed outwards remains the same as one 
observer has quoted the Brigass leader Pius Lustrilanang to have said; “The main idea 
is to protect democracy. We know that the democratic system still needs 
consolidation, protection, because it still faces dangers. Without a solid force to 
protect it, democracy will be in jeopardy. This is what we are protecting” (Sofian 
2003: 650). Despite such embroidered comments, there was a significant change in 
the position of Brigass when Megawati became president in 2001. From being a 
mobile organization established to propel Megawati into the presidency, it has 
adapted survival tactics to hold on to its members, its support, and its position in 
society. Since its founding in 1999, the particular arena of operation has been 
broadened and so its structures have been institutionalized. There are about eight sub-
structures of Brigass, each representing different types of businesses (perusahan) 
such as security (keamanan) , stability (stabilitas), and kaki lima (vendors ect).39 
Brigass represents a changing in the organizational landscape of preman 
organizations by their quasi-independent role in relation to their mother party PDI-P. 
Since the 1999 elections, the PDI-P satgas provided the main muscle power for the 
party, as well as a clientelistic network for its members. Since Brigass came onto the 
arena of semi-official and unofficial politically affiliated militias in Bogor, a conflict 
has developed between the PDI-P satgas, who among other things earn their wages 
by charging toll money from the traffic in and out of central Bogor and Brigass over 
                                              
39 Brigass Commander (2004) interview, October.  
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access to these funds. Brigass has achieved a more prominent elitist position than its 
affiliates, the satgas PDI-P in Bogor and Jakarta. This access to business does also, 
paradoxically, broaden its mandate to apply coercive methods whenever needed. 
Many would say that Brigass function as Taufiq Kiemas’ previously mentioned as 
head of the so-called Palembang mafia, own private security apparatus40. The Brigass 
highest commander Lustrilanang close connection and friendship to Taufiq Kiemas, 
businessman and PDI-P official, has been up for discussion in the Indonesian press 
on several occasions. 
All of these militias are heavily ingrained in Indonesian society. If you know 
what to look for they are one every street corner going about their business of money 
collection, commanding the traffic, or before the election handing out flyers for their 
party. They are crowding the reception rooms of their political patrons; rolling their 
cigarettes, discussing the business, and lamenting information over bills passed or 
building contracts handed out. In essence they form organizations in their own 
respect offering their strength to political parties. They are highly structured and well 
organized. The reformasi cliché has sounded that belum ada perubahan pola pikir – 
the patterns of thought have not yet changed. It is a useful phrase for the political 
actors, at once suggesting that violence is the fashion of the day. For the commander 
of AMKA in Yogyakarta, his fondness for the gaya militer- military style- is the only 
political model ever directly experienced. Therefore it is also the most common 
excuse made by the carriers of party colored uniforms. Politik premanisme was 
possibly Suharto’s greatest contribution to the state, is the only political model ever 
experienced by Indonesia’s younger generation.  
The relevant characteristics of civilian militias of the likes of Brigass and GPK 
are their positioning between the formal and the informal. They operate on the 
borderline of the official and unofficial, the legitimate and illegitimate, providing 
muscle power to their goons while mobilizing around their ideological and religious 
expressions. As has been discussed, during the New Order it was common knowledge 
                                              
40 Sofian Asgart (2004) interview, Rizal Panggabean (2004) interview.  
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that the power of the youth organizations (civilian militias) was rooted in their 
associates with local military commands. Today, this power is more dispersed, and 
controlling thugs is a necessity for most political actors. That said, clearly the New 
Order mafiosos are still well placed to threaten and deploy violence as an important 
means to secure control local state apparatus. With the changing role of the military, 
militias and thugs are especially needed. Because militias such as Brigass and GPK in 
a similar vein as IPK and Pemuda Pancasila, preside over lucrative enterprises such 
as gambling and smuggling networks they are able to influence policy bids. Some 
argue that the leadership is also potentially able to influence policy decisions in local 
parliaments, especially the allocation of contracts(Hadiz 2003: 128).41  
One of the central arguments for this thesis, as expressed in chapter two, is that 
those social forces that mobilize into such violence groups as Brigass and GPK form 
part of a legitimate democratic expression, while at the same time fuelling predatory 
politics. The following few paragraphs pay attention to precisely these social 
mobilization forces are rooted in a combination of modern affinities and historically 
embedded continuities.  
 
6.1.2 Crime, Politics, and Semi-Legitimacy 
The historical role and position of the Javanese thief and the correlation between the 
New Order security policy and its policy on targeting criminal reveal the peculiar 
nature of the accepted and unaccepted in Indonesian society and politics. Extralegal 
violence as it is organized in Indonesia is highly influenced by these historical 
proficiencies. The labeling of preman illustrate well how violence and crime moves 
between the accepted and the unaccepted. The preman label may best be described as 
a label befitting gangsters, disenfranchised and unemployed youth, and certain 
members of the informal labor sector or the local bully (Ryter 1998, King 1999). 
Most would be able to pick out the preman from the street, from characteristics of 
street boys or boys just hanging out in the mall. Mostly the membership of civilian 
militias such as Brigass and GPK, as well as the more officially rooted party security 
                                              
41 Rizal Panggabean, UGM (2004) Interview.  
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groups, satgas is made up of preman. It is not a label only ascribed to the petty street 
criminal, but is also frequently used for positioned politicians who have a background 
in illegitimate business. In this respect, the labeling serves to communicate a vague 
categorization of people who in some way or other is or has been involved in crime, 
connect to a criminal underworld, or has been found not to always adhere to 
legitimate methods. It is within this last respect one talks about “preman politics” or 
“politik premanisme.”  
One of the issues to surface from the expansion of the PDI-P after 1998 was the 
relationship between PDI-P and the preman world. As much as the PDI-P drew 
support from across the entire spectrum, its face was that of unemployed urban youth. 
It is within this stratum that the preman world is also located for “as much as preman 
represent the underworld, they also stand for the underclass” (Ryter 1998: 23). As a 
social force and mobilizational tactics, the inclusion of preman into the political ranks 
of the parties has been met with endless criticism from reformist observers. The 
satgas commanders have responded to such criticism by saying that they do not 
demand all members to be university educated (Kompas 2004, 26 Feb.). That said, 
the recruitment of satgas is mostly from among ex-convicts and groups in the 
underworld (ibid.). 
In terms of symbolic attributes, there are both elements of globalization – the 
GPK and FPI claiming they are part of an international religious movement42, and 
localization–PDI-P satgas reminiscing about the Sukarno period viewing their 
symbolic role in the same light43. Its most popular connotations are however to the 
various guerrilla units of the liberation struggles. To GPK members, as well as the 
other religiously based militias, the term laskar has a rich historical heritage 
embedded in notions of populism and a form for accepted radicalism. Today many 
various laskar are linked to conservative Islamic parties, and at times have 
                                              
42 Although the members of religiously based militias such as the GPK and FPI express views in public about their 
affiliation to certain Middle Eastern religious groups, they form part of an ideologically and organizationally fragmented 
local network rather than an international movement for Pan-Islam (Ari Dwipayana UGM interview and William Clarence-
Smith 2003).  
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demonstrated strong links to the military, such as the Laskar Jihad mobilized to fight 
in the Maluku conflict, or Front Pembela Islam (FPI), an militia loosely organized 
but with local branches all over Indonesia.44 Undoubtedly, many laskar units imagine 
themselves to be the Hezbollah or Diponogara Division of the 1940s.45 That said, 
while in the 1999 election, their purpose could be twisted into something reminiscent 
of a liberation groups in 2004 their existence reflect the new political paradigm of the 
reformasi era. Among the young recruits, there exists a romantic picture of their role 
as warriors for democracy, or as defenders for their religion.  
From one angle both satgas and laskar are seen as criminal gangs who have 
offered their strength to political parties in exchange for receiving a quasi-legitimate 
position and protection (Nordholt 2002: 51), while on the other hand these “criminal 
gangs” are as much mobilized and protected by the political party and/or their orang 
besar. This might be a question of “what comes first, the hen or the egg”, it 
nevertheless plays a significant role in understanding the dynamics between 
“kriminalitas” and “politik”.  From the perspective of the power holders, the various 
strongmen and politicians, the increased market for competition requires the symbolic 
demonstration of power via mass followings on the one hand, but also the strategic 
access to coercive means of power to be able to keep control over their assets. When 
thugs from “purity movements” such as the GPK and FPI attack karaoke bars or 
gambling dens, the “environment” within which social forces are mobilized is 
defined by two elements: firstly, the ideological expression required to mobilize and 
recruit members and supporters, and secondly the delimitation of an area from which 
an orang besar can extract resources to uphold one’s own position.  
                                                                                                                                           
43 The wall in the PDI-P head office in Yogyakarta is decorated by a photo of Sukarno, while the much smaller photo pf 
Megawati hanss in the corner out of view. In conversation the PDI-P satgas said they viewed themselves as carrying on 
Sukarno’s battle fro freedom, and in similar veins compared themselves to revolutionary pemuda.  
44 Inteview Sofian Asgart (2004).  
45 In three of the interviews with youth activists who claimed to have been members of laskar jihad , Gerakan Pemuda 
Kab’ah, and another less known loosely knit assembly in Gun Jack’s (a Yogyakarta wealthy Muslim businessman) 
surroundings they initially talked about the role of Islam in the Indonesia’s historical pretext, and emphasized the need for 
continuing the independence struggle. They also emphasized their strong sympathies with the Syrian Hezbollah, and 
claimed they performed the same role in Indonesia (to impress the interviewer, but also to demonstrate their own self-
assurance and legitimacy in a broader historical and international context).  
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As discussed previously dominant actors depend on their elected positions to 
achieve and maintain their power bases. While during the New Order the 
organizational landscape was strictly limited to a set of ‘legalized’ organizations, the 
current trend in violence groups is its fragmented nature. The fragmented 
organizational landscape provides a broad range of opportunities. With new power 
centers and increased competition between ‘men of prowess’, there are new and 
different opportunities opening to manipulating patronage relations and climb high in 
the ranks of the government.46 As a result of this potential for social mobility and the 
cultural valuation of high social status, the desire for honor and power is one of the 
strongest motivating forces for many Indonesians.47 Being a commander in a militia 
is a position achieved for virtues such as bravery, loyalties, and charisma. The 
preman type can inhibit all these qualities that can make one into a man of prowess.  
The military attributes and the ranking of individual members in the civilian 
militias represent a hierarchical system in which reaching high status and positioning 
is connected to a number of accredits. Interesting, but not surprisingly many of the 
high ranking political leaders or leaders in NU started out as activists and 
commanders in their affiliated youth groups. This pattern has persisted today, but 
now also in relation to the militias outside the official party structure. Although all 
political parties have legitimate youth groups, being a commander of militias often 
provides one with a better patronage network directly linked to individual actors than 
do youth groups of the political parties.48    
It is worth noting that a number of the civilian militias that dominate the 
underground illegal activities, currently occupy local political offices, and that some 
have migrated from Golkar to other parties, including PPP and PDI-P (Robison and 
Hadiz 2004: 247). Although Brigass is only affiliated to the PDI-P, Brigass has much 
more leverage and is much more the tool of individual actors in the PDI-P, and thus 
                                              
46 Rizal Panggabean interview (2004).  
47 Similar observations were made by Rizal Panggabean interview and Ari Dwipayana interview.  
48 Zuhdi Muhdlor (2004), Leader of Ansor Yogyakarta branch. Interview Yogyakarta, Septmeber.  
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represent a more procuring patronage network than do the official paramilitary wing 
(satgas) of PDI-P in Bogor.49   
On that note, the ability to incorporate thugs/preman into the party 
surroundings depends on the capacity to provide them with work and money. 
Changing patronage networks occur when the party or the individual politician looses 
the funds to support their Satgas. On that note, according to a Golkar satgas 
commander, who himself escaped the Petrus killings in the 1980s, it is integral that 
the militias are able to hold on to organizational structures and employment 
opportunities in order for the organization to continue to operate also in situations 
when the party elite does not need them. “To the party elite we are only chess-men to 
be sacrificed when needed. Then they play us against each other. The irony is that 
there are those who don’t realize that in this game the men can start killing each 
other” (Kompas 2004: Feb.26). What seems to have happened since the fall of 
Suharto, for better or for worse, the symbiosis between crime and politics has again 
been decentralized, and the patronage over criminal rackets and militias been taken 
over by local power brokers, politicians and other dominant actors. This 
decentralization and “civilization” of coercive state apparatuses encouraged first 
under the Dutch, then under Suharto remains an enduring and powerful legacy in 
Indonesia. These legacies do in due turn serve to blur the lines between state-society, 
military-paramilitary, civil-military, and between legal-illegal with a variety of 
peculiar coercive formations, such as the thugs operating at the behest of entrenched 
local political actors and oligarchs. Moreover the patterns for organizing and 
managing law enforcement tend to prefigure a recurring cycle of intensified 
subcontracting and privatization of violence not only during periods of great stress, 
but also during times when power contestation between various local elites peak such 
as prior to a local election or during competition over contracts, and the mere need for 
flexed muscles in a meeting.50  
                                              
49 Sofian Asgart (2004) interview.  
50 Interview Sandyawan, Jakarta 2004.  
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Beyond the noted historical affinity between the phenomenon of political 
parties and politically affiliated militias and paramilitaries, the nature and direction of 
mobilization campaigns since 1998 reveal a peculiar, yet familiar dialectic of sorts. 
On the one hand, mobilization in the name of civil society and democracy focuses 
considerable energies on promoting elections, running for elections, and political 
representation. On the other hand, mobilization by civilian militias and party security 
groups (satgas) releases powerful forces for threat of violence within the same arena 
in which political expression takes place. Thus juxtaposed, the inviolate sacredness of 
the electoral ballot and the submission to national citizenship celebrated in official 
political discourse both nationally and internationally appears in sharp contrast to the 
violent profanation of militarism and the ideological sovereignty of the satgas and 
milisi sipil that paradoxically form part of the institutional democratic expression. In 
combination then, the dynamic of the various social forces helps to clinch the 
subsequent institutionalization of multiparty elections, the concomitant entrenchment 
of oligarchic dominance and effective marginalization of organized civil society in 
post-Suharto Indonesia.  
 
6.2 Legitimacy and the Subcontracting of Violence  
The process of regime transition lent additional impetus to political mobilization in 
Indonesia. As discussed above, the transition process did not only involve the 
implementation of democratic institutions and procedures, but also, arguably, an 
intensification in violence committed by civilian actors. These civilian actors form 
part of a broad organizational landscape that operate in relation to dominant actors in 
a symbiotic relationship. The transition regime intrinsically encouraged revitalization 
of both civil and the not so civil society at the local level. The most virulent 
manifestations of militia-violence appear to occur when and where contestation over 
access to power and resources in a local area peaks. The backing is both to 
demonstrate symbolic support in forms of a mass following, to have sources available 
in case of specific threats from i.e. the press, the courts, other bosses/politicians 
fighting over the same material or symbolic sources of power.  
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One major factor for the use of party-linked militias lies in the need for various 
actors to deny that they are breaking established norms of behavior. Each party 
member interviewed would, naturally so, deny the implications with underground 
activity and specific incidents of violence. The political parties and their leaders are 
bound by internal and external norms that place limits on their range of options. In 
the electoral framework, the demand for legitimacy both on personal morale and the 
party’s political promises define much of how they relate and communicate with the 
public. Only civil militias and other covert means provide plausible deniability of the 
politician or the party’s involvement in illegal activity or violence. The public expect 
adherence to a rule of law and a certain set or norms. This kind of legitimacy did also 
play a role for Golkar members under Suharto, but as long as the amount of votes did 
not matter that much, the use and dependency on civilian militias was much less 
covert. A previous member of Pemuda Pancasila said in a conversation that although 
it has always been the case that the PP carried out the dirty work for the party 
officials in election campaigns before, the link had always been clear. “Today Golkar 
members would not even acknowledge the PP’s existence as structure within the 
Golkar official structures. Of course, everyone knows the link, but now the politicians 
are more concerned with not being criticized by the press. But nothing has changed 
that much. PP still does the same dirty work”51  
 As this case also illustrate the rising demands for human rights and legal 
norms for political actors also play a role. The criticism from international NGOs, 
democracy advisors, and the Indonesian free press as regards to the role of 
satgas/politically affiliated civilian militias including pam swakarsa, and the relative 
need for them, has made party leaders become increasingly uncomfortable with 
acknowledging the militias’ real ascendancy. In this respect, party officials and NU-
leaders are very concerned with conveying the message that satgas are meant for 
“internal security measures only” and that “military attire is only like a scout’s 
                                              
51 Interview with groups of Pemuda Pancasila members (2004) Jakarta, October.  
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uniform”.52 Parties willing to use extralegal violence thus have reasons to appear 
uninvolved in order to keep up the façade as democratic actors. The charade does not 
usually last very long, but it is difficult to prove party complicity in the specific 
actions of paramilitaries and militias. Such proof usually comes at a very high cost 
for local human rights activists and journalists who are themselves often the target of 
thugs.  
It is in this need for legitimacy as well as a certain social standing that most 
groups also carry out educational efforts and welfare programs among the poor. All 
militia commanders and party officials highlight the social programs of their 
organizations and that they are popular in their local communities.53 There is no 
doubt that these efforts also strengthen their strong holds in local communities, 
provide the commanders with a valuable social standing, as well as a good basis for 
mobilization. There is no evidence that their dependency on militias and control over 
the means of violence is on the way out however.  
 Although dominant actors continually operate in relation to the state, the 
competition over elected positions and the spoils deriving from such positions 
demand control over means of violence. The fragmented nature of elites, as was 
previously illustrated has contributed to the upholding of violence groups mobilized 
in relation to political parties or religious organizations. The dominant actors are 
obliged to reach outside the normative liberal framework ideally concurred by 
democratization to find tools or helpers necessary to perform all the tasks at hand. 
While in an authoritarian situation, it was the state itself that subcontracted important 
political and social tasks that fell outside their legitimate behavioral zone. In a post-
authoritarian situation characterized by competition and fragmentation dominant 
actors through their private interest groups which in Indonesia are rooted in political 
parties and/or social religious groups such as the NU, subcontract and mobilize these 
patterns themselves, escalating and dispersing the use of violence at the local level. In 
                                              
52 Similar views were expressed by Golkar leaders, interview Yogyakarta 2004, Zuhdi Muhdlor, Ansor leader interview 
2004, and Pak Djuwarto, PDI-P Chairman interview 2004.  
53 The social activities of the militias was highlighted by all senior actors interviewed.  
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a situation where predatory money politics dominate subcontracting assumes 
malevolent forms such as the formation, mobilization and upholding of paramilitary 
auxiliaries as seen in Indonesia.  
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks  
The civilian militias exist against a backdrop of transition, playing into the field of 
competition between Indonesian big men of politics. In the current political climate in 
Indonesia politicians and parties are struggling to find their own foothold and 
building new networks. In a very similar vein their organizational networks 
consisting of preman provide muscle and support for particular streams within the 
political arena. Under the new circumstances of multiparty democracy, these 
tendencies are naturally changing and tentatively fiddling new strings of power. The 
chapter has highlighted the procuring situation with a variety of organized civilian 
militias representing social forces with certain, albeit narrow, ideological grounds, 
who are attached to political parties or individual rent-seeking power brokers. The 
main conclusion oof this chapter is the significance of their affiliation to political 
parties, while at the same time changing alliances to where the funding is. The 
chapter has highlighted that violence should be interpreted in light of the function and 
realities of violence groups as social forces with qualifying organizational structures. 
Furthermore the chapter has highlighted the moving ground for preman in relation to 
these politically affiliated militias, arguing that these militias, by their ways of 
running lucrative businesses and being close allies with politicians, are important 
parts of the coalitions and networks discussed in chapter five.  
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7. FINAL CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The overthrow of Suharto in May 1998 ushered a period of political openness not 
seen in Indonesia for decades. Perhaps nothing better epitomizes the years since the 
onset of reformasi than the mix of prospect coupled with increased disappointment 
amongst pro-democracy activists. The visual dominance of military-styled uniformed 
young politically affiliated militias and unofficial ‘security guards’ could not contrast 
more starkly with those ideals of democracy proposed by these activists. It was this 
puzzle of ‘violence and democracy’ that triggered the topic for this thesis. The 
research question set out in the introductory chapter was thus: How should one 
interpret violence in a situation of democratic politics?  
The starting point for the thesis was the problematic limitations of the general 
democratization paradigm captured by a neo-liberal agenda and a scholarly emphasis 
on pact-making between soft –and hard liners assuming democratization involves a 
transition from A to B, from an authoritarian situation to a democratic situation. 
Theoretically, the thesis has argued that arguments rooted in political economy that 
seek to explain the democratic deficit from the perspective of New Order oligarchs 
does not sufficiently fulfill the limitations of conventional transition studies and the 
neo-liberal agenda of the World Bank. Rather, in order to analyze violence one must 
turn to more historical and structurally based arguments that see current-day events in 
light of structures and dynamics that have evolved out of a particular historical 
situation. The thesis distinguishes the two variables local elites and civilian violence 
groups from the historically founded theoretical discussion on violence in Indonesia.  
The two angles based on a broad and deep-rooted discussion on the genealogies of 
elite relations and violence which effectfully capture the nuances of political 
organization and elite-manipulation that make violence a stringent phenomenon in 
the post-Suharto democratic era. The empirical material has been focused around two 
broad dimensions; the role and implications of local elites and the nature those main 
perpetrators of violence, privatized civilian militias operating in the close vicinity of 
political parties and religious organizations. The first part of the analytical discussion 
treated the particularities of the Indonesian context by through a periodization 
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highlighting the turning points in history arguing that their ascendancy is dependent 
on the nature of the state. The following two chapter discussed first the changing 
realities for local elites in relation to the implementation of democratic instruments 
and decentralization reforms, and secondly the nature and environment for civilian 
miltias, arguing that they form part of a patronage network which has a particular 
function in the new system. The main argument is then that through monopolizing 
and hijacking democratic institutions for self aggrandizement makes violence 
indispensable. The following few pages discuss these conclusion in more depth.  
 
7.1 Argumentative Conclusions  
The discussion on relevant theoretical variables and delimitations forwarded the 
question of how dominant actors relate to and make use of democratic institutions 
based on the Demos survey results arguing that democratic instruments have been 
hijacked and monopolized by dominant actors in order to get access to and control 
over state resources. With the decentralization reforms, local parliament have become 
key mediators in distributing and controlling rents, while the central state continues to 
control important revenues and natural resources. During the New Order, dominant 
actors operated through the state co-editing their roles as administrators in the 
bureaucracy and state enterprise, relying heavily on the military. In the post-Suharto 
period, controlling local parliaments has been the most attractive means to get access 
to state power.  
Democratization has, naturally so meant a broadening of the arena for actors 
seeking to gain control over rents, which has implied increased competition between 
actors in getting control over elected positions, investing huge just in order to pay off 
coalition partners and associates. Short-term rent seeking is thus necessary to ensure 
quick pay-offs for the investments made to get into position. Under the new auspices 
the centralized patronage system of Suharto has collapsed and a much more fluid and 
competitive system of patronage has established itself. The fears amongst critics of 
the conventional democratization paradigm in the immediate years after the demise of 
the New Order, was that an Indonesian variety of local bossism would manifest itself. 
In stead, arguably as a result of both historical and institutional limitations this kind 
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‘local authoritarianism’ has not evolved. The Indonesian trajectory has hindered the 
formation of particularly strong clans or bosses able to monopolize power and control 
local economy by the means of violence and institutional measures. In stead, there are 
evidence of a kind of fragmentation of the elites who depend on controlling local 
parliaments in order to achieve power. Furthermore, this study has revealed that this 
kind of fragmented system of elite domination affects the way violence is mobilized 
and used.  
 Linking to the problems of decentralization, an important concerned raised in 
the theoretical discussion was whether decentralization can entail the consequences 
that political authorities will use criminal networks to maintain or revive power. 
Based on the information collected the study has argued that a distinction between a 
‘real’ and an informal ‘shadow sate’ does not capture the real dynamics of the 
predatory state. It is by working through the state controlling elected positions and 
parliaments, that predatory money politics is machinated. Decisions may be 
dependent on where the money flows and the excess of thugs to support them, but the 
most peculiar phenomenon of the Indonesian political realities, is especially the way 
informal politicking, such as corruption and violence, is an integral part of formal 
politics. Due to short-term rent seeking local politicians are highly dependent on 
access to an apparatus of violence. With the elimination of central state patronage 
these means of violence have been privatized. Politicians running for positions are 
thus helped not only by money, but also by the mobilization of civilian militias and 
thugs to intimidate legislators and supporters of the rival candidate.  
The theoretical discussion in chapter two presented a third argument/variable 
necessary to understand this particular symbiosis between crime and politics so 
evident in today’s Indonesia. In order to say something about this relationship it was 
necessary to trace the logic of how the state has one the one hand mobilized and 
legitimized criminal forces, while on the other hand designing system to control it. 
Under Suharto the traditional policing measures were incorporated into the state’s 
official security apparatus, recruiting civilians, especially preman to create as much 
security as insecurity. The system was not only about subcontracting simple security 
tasks to local watchmen, but about providing a legal and accepted framework from 
  
87
which the state could draw mobilizational potential for covert operations. The now so 
common system of subcontracting violence to private militias by elites thus 
originated as a New Order official security policy which has found new leverage in 
the democratic era. In contrast however, the fragmented and elusive pattern of elite 
mobilization has shaped the mobilization and potential for violence groups as well. 
With their different camouflage uniforms and regalia they function as private armies 
that can be mobilized at the behest of the rich, powerful and ruthless. The fact that 
many of them emphasize their independence from their original associative political 
party or religious groups, signifies their flexibility. The situation of a large number of 
fragmented civilian militias mobilized around vague ideals of Islam, or democracy or 
rooted in some historical association of independence fighters, trigger comparisons to 
previous periods. Chapter four of the thesis highlighted the system of mobilization of 
civilians to carry out extreme violence at two turning points in history: the revolution 
and the 1965 massacres. Evidently, in conclusion, it is fruitful to highlight these 
similarities. The most interesting result of this process tracing has been to see the 
changing nature of mobilization between the two periods. During the revolution 
violence was mobilized locally and privatized. The same can be said about the 
mobilization of civilian militias during the 1965 massacres, only that this was the 
starting point of a institutionalization of violence under the patronage of one big boss.  
On that note, the fourth central argument framing the analysis of violence 
groups and the environment within which they exist was to see them as social forces 
operating on the behest of dominant actors, but with an important historical trajectory 
representing the capacities for using extreme violence. Under the protectorate of 
powerful goons and politicians they extend their reach into society by intimidating 
shop owners and ordinary people.  
It has often been assumed in the theoretical framings on democratization, 
transition, and decentralization that the authoritarian state is the main perpetrator of 
violence by being able to monopolize the means of violence. As the discussion on the 
particularities of the Indonesian context has illustrated, the Indonesia state could 
claim such a monopoly on violence only to the extent to which it could incorporate 
preman and figures of criminality into its own ranks. The thesis has traced the 
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changing continuities in the relationship between militias/preman and the state. The 
thesis has incorporated a functional analysis of the role of the ‘criminal type’ –
preman within the political party, as commanders and members of militias, and the 
reasons for their relative social mobility on the political arena. While previously 
gangsters operated on the behest of their military patrons, the current competitive 
system of party mobilization seem to also attract gangsters. Furthermore, as long as 
the militias are lucrative for the party, and the party a lucrative companion for the 
militia, within the existing party system and structure  the militia may provide 
stepping board for a further political career.  
 Importantly, playing politics legitimately, although it is a real sham is essential 
for Indonesian elites. The privatization and subcontracting of violence does evidently 
illustrate this. With criticism form the Indonesian press and the international 
community there are trends that political parties are getting rid of their satgas units, in 
stead relying on their affiliated militias mobilized outside the official party structure. 
In Indonesia, keeping up face and pride is essential for big men of prowess, and so 
keeping violence in the dark is also rather traditional trait.  
On that final note, the privatization of violence and the subcontracting of 
specific tasks such as intimidation, security (and insecurity), protection racketeering, 
demonstration of mass support is symbolic of the nature of the predatory politics 
which continues to dominate local politics in Indonesia. The machination of money 
politics ingrained with a competitive system of electioneering to gain state access, 
makeup the particular elite structures and dynamics for mobilizing (and creating) and 
incorporating criminal elements into the arena for democratic politics and power.  
.  
7.2 Final Remarks   
Finally, under the new situation of democratic politics the violence groups like those 
discussed in this thesis, perform the same tasks as did the state-sanctioned youth 
groups and military under the New Order. That is not to say that the situation has not 
changed at all. The main problem for all those good actors mobilized to change the 
political situation, increasing representation and accountability on behalf of those 
elected is exactly that the democratic instruments of power have been monopolized 
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and hijacked by predatory elites (see Demos 2004). As this study has revealed the 
battle to control elected positions among groups and networks of predatory elites is 
one of the key variables that upholds the existence and dependence on civilian 
violence groups in the post-Suharto era.  
For future concern, the existence and mobilization potential of civilian violence 
groups, represent the greatest threat of violence in Indonesian society. As one 
observer said about the Philippines; “post colonial Philippine society and 
politics…trace the tortuous trajectory on a slippery slope between officially 
sanctioned emergencies and the normality of the abnormal” (Hedman 2000: 143). In 
many ways, the Indonesian realities are similar. Militias do, whether as demonstrative 
uniformed civilian militias or as mysterious ninjas, demonstrate how blood-letting 
reflects the normality of society and thus also the normality of the abnormal.  
 
 
 
 
.  
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